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Rothschild:

UNREASONABLE RISK: THE FAILURE TO BAN ASBESTOS AND
THE FUTURE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES REGULATION
RACHEL ROTHSCHILD*
Every day, Americans are exposed to hundreds of chemicals in the air we breathe, the
water we drink, and the products we use. The vast majority of these chemicals have never been
tested for safety. Many have been shown to cause serious health harms, ranging from cancer to
autoimmune illness to IQ loss. They also have disproportionate effects on some of the most
vulnerable populations in our society, such as children, minorities, and industrial workers.
The law that is supposed to protect Americans from dangerous chemical exposures – the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) – was long considered a dead letter after EPA’s failure to
ban asbestos, an extremely hazardous carcinogen. The agency issued a ban in 1989, but it was
promptly struck down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA. Following the Fifth Circuit decision in 1991, the agency never again sought to
exercise its authority under TSCA to prohibit the use of a chemical already on the market.
For the next several decades, EPA officials, environmental groups, and members of
Congress debated the reasons that EPA’s asbestos regulation did not survive judicial review and
whether TSCA should be amended in response. According to certain agency staff and some
environmental organizations, TSCA’s requirement that EPA perform a cost-benefit analysis to
justify the asbestos ban made it impossible for the regulation to stand up to judicial scrutiny. As a
result, when Congress had a once in a generation opportunity to amend TSCA in 2016, Democrats
made removal of cost-benefit analysis from determinations about whether a substance poses an
unreasonable risk their top priority in negotiations with Republicans. To earn Republican support
for changing the law, Democrats agreed to include sweeping preemption of state toxic chemical
controls, which had been a major goal of the chemical industry.
Yet a historical examination of the asbestos episode reveals that the accepted story of
EPA’s failure is wrong. Archival documents, many of which have never been viewed by those
outside EPA, demonstrate that it was not cost-benefit considerations that doomed the asbestos
regulation. Instead, disagreements with the Office of Management and Budget over whether EPA
or OSHA should address asbestos and EPA’s refusal to fully quantify harms and monetize benefits
were largely responsible for the problems with issuing the regulation and marshalling enough
support to withstand judicial review. In fact, EPA could have justified the ban on cost-benefit
grounds if the agency had quantified and monetized the benefits using information available to it.
This paper makes several arguments based on how science and economics were used – and
misused – to justify the asbestos ban. The first is that Democrats in Congress struck the wrong
bargain with Republicans in the 2016 amendments to TSCA and failed to fix the underlying
problems with toxics regulation. As a result, the same challenges that plagued the asbestos ban
have continued to frustrate EPA efforts since Congress amended the law. Other methodological
approaches for deciding when to regulate require similar informational inputs, expertise, and value
judgments. The paper therefore suggests that environmental scholarship and advocacy should focus
greater attention on how underlying analytical assumptions shape all methods for deciding whether
or not to regulate. Finally, and more poignantly, this paper serves as an example of why accurate,
well-sourced history is essential for understanding how administrative agencies function and what
lessons we should draw from their successes and failures. Had Democrats been aware of what
actually transpired within EPA and the executive branch, they would have been much better
equipped to enact meaningful TSCA reform.
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Thomas Bennett, Barry
Friedman, Robert Glicksman, Shi-Ling Hsu, Daniel Hulsebosch, David Kamin, Sally Katzen, Daniel Kevles,
Michael Livermore, Jonathan Masur, Nina Mendelson, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Richard Revesz, Noah
Rosenblum, Catherine Sharkey, David Uhlmann and Katrina Wyman for conversations about this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
Baby powder has long been a staple in homes across America and around the
world. The iconic image of a newborn doused in the fine white substance helped its maker,
Johnson & Johnson, promote itself as a wholesome, trusted brand.1 Though baby powder
sales have been just a small part of Johnson & Johnson’s yearly profits, consumer faith in
the product helped propel the company to the top of the Fortune 500 list for decades.2
That public trust was recently shattered as U.S. government tests revealed the
presence of asbestos in Johnson & Johnson’s baby powder.3 Asbestos is a known
1

See Tiffany Hsu & Roni Caryn Rabin, Johnson & Johnson to End Talc-Based Baby Powder Sales in
North America, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/19/business/johnson-babypowder-sales-stopped.html.
2
See N.Y. Times The Weekly, v. Johnson & Johnson, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/the-weekly/johnson-johnson-baby-powder-cancer-lawsuits.html
(discussing recent lawsuits over asbestos in baby powder).
3
See Tiffany Hsu & Roni Caryn Rabin, Johnson & Johnson Recalls Baby Powder Over Asbestos Worry,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/business/johnson-johnson-baby-powderrecall.html. On litigation over possible asbestos in Johnson & Johnson baby powder, see Roni Caryn Rabin &
Tiffany Hsu, Johnson & Johnson Feared Baby Powder’s Possible Asbestos Link for Years, N.Y. TIMES,
(Dec.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/business/baby-powder-asbestos-johnsonjohnson.html.
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carcinogen, and those exposed to the substance can develop a number of serious health
issues, including mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis.4 The government findings
prompted Johnson & Johnson to swiftly issue a voluntary recall of the product before
discontinuing its production of baby powder altogether.5
The discovery contributed to renewed questions about why the U.S. has not banned
asbestos, as 70 other countries have done.6 Recent scientific studies estimate that asbestos
kills more than 40,000 people annually in the United States.7 This is comparable to the
number of people who die every year from car accidents,8 firearms,9 or opioid overdoses.10
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), originally passed in 1976, is the federal
law that regulates chemicals like asbestos.11 When it was enacted, the law distinguished
between “new” chemicals not yet on the market and “existing” chemicals already in use.
The former had to undergo EPA review before they could be introduced into commerce,
while the latter were simply allowed to remain on the market without any safety testing.12
The vast majority of chemicals in use today—tens of thousands—were already on the
market in 1976 and thus exempted from any safety testing under the law, including
asbestos.13 Under TSCA’s section 6, EPA could only restrict or ban these chemicals if the
agency found that they posed an “unreasonable risk” to human health or the environment.14
The statute did not define what constituted an “unreasonable risk,” though it did require
EPA to consider a chemical’s health and environmental effects and the economic
consequences of restrictions before regulating it.15
4

See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY
678 (2004).
5
See Hsu & Rabin, supra note 1.
6
See Owen Dyer, Johnson & Johnson Recalls its Baby Powder after FDA Finds Asbestos in Sample,
367 BMJ l6118 (Oct. 21, 2019).
7
See GBD Results Tool, INST. HEALTH METRICS & EVALUATION, http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-resultstool?params=gbd-api-2019-permalink/e42ad5d4422141c71c08eafd0e78dbf8 (last visited May 29, 2021)
(compiling data on all asbestos deaths caused by occupational exposure for 2019 that led to mesothelioma,
asbestosis, tracheal, and ovarian cancer).
8
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: RESEARCH NOTE 1 (Oct. 2020),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813021 (stating that 36,096 Americans died in
vehicle crashes in 2019).
9
See National Center for Health Statistics, FastStats: All Injuries, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm (last visited May 29, 2021) (finding 39,707 U.S. firearm
fatalities in 2019).
10
See Drug Overdose Deaths, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/
statedeaths.html (last visited May 21, 2021) (finding 49,860 opioid overdoses in 2019).
11
The Act does not govern regulation of pesticides, drugs, tobacco, food, cosmetics, and firearms, which
are controlled by other statutes. See Linda-Jo Schierow, The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA): A
Summary of the Act and Its Major Requirements, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (Apr. 1, 2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31905.pdf.
12
See Richard Denison, EPA’s New Chemicals Program: TSCA Dealt EPA A Very Poor Hand, ENV’T
DEFENSE FUND BLOG (Apr. 16, 2019), http://blogs.edf.org/health/2009/04/16/epas-new-chemicals-programtsca-dealt-epa-a-very-poor-hand/.
13
See id.
14
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2629
(1976)) (hereinafter “Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976”), § 2605(a) (providing that the Administrator
can regulate an existing chemical upon finding that it “presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury
to health or the environment”).
15
Id. § 2605(c)(1)(A)–(D). In fact, most U.S. laws that deal with chemical regulation do not set any
guidelines for what constitutes an acceptable level of risk. See Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray, & John D.
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The dangers of asbestos were widely known at the time of TSCA’s enactment,
prompting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use the chemical as a “test case”
for regulating toxic chemicals under section 6.16 In 1989, ten years after EPA first issued
an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on asbestos, the agency finalized a regulation
implementing a total ban on all but the most essential uses of the chemical.17
Manufacturers swiftly challenged the rule in court, arguing that EPA violated TSCA’s cost
consideration requirements18 and the statute’s rulemaking procedures.19
To the shock of the agency and environmental groups, in 1991 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously vacated the asbestos regulation in Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA.20 The judges primarily struck down the ban because of flaws in
EPA’s assessment of whether the avoided health harms from asbestos exposure justified
the regulation’s costs.21 The court was sharply critical of the agency’s decision not to
quantify and monetize a large number of health benefits from the ban.22 Asserting that
unquantified benefits should not be used as a “trump card allowing EPA to justify any cost
calculus, no matter how high,” the court held that EPA had violated TSCA’s mandate to
“weigh the costs of its actions” before regulating.23 It also found that EPA had violated the
statute’s requirement to issue the “least burdensome” regulation by not assessing the costs
and benefits of any alternatives to a ban.24
Following Corrosion Proof Fittings, EPA did not reissue the asbestos regulation
and never again attempted to ban a chemical under section 6.25 According to some agency
Graham, Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 269, 273
(1992) (explaining that there are no guidelines in U.S. laws that set “a universally acceptable or unacceptable
numerical level of risk for use in regulatory decisions”).
16
See Mark A. Greenwood, former Assistant General Counsel for Pesticides and Toxic Substances and
Director, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, interview by Jody A. Roberts and Kavita D. Hardy at
Ropes & Gray, LLP, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 2010) (Philadelphia: Chemical Heritage Foundation, Oral
History Transcript 0644) (hereinafter “Greenwood Interview”) (“[Asbestos] was, kind of, going to be the test
case of how TSCA can do things.”).
17
See EPA, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce
Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (July 12, 1989) (hereinafter “1989 Asbestos Rule”).
18
See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that petitioners
claimed EPA’s ban was “not promulgated on the basis of substantial evidence” because of insufficient
consideration of the costs of the ban compared to other regulatory alternatives).
19
See id. at 1211 (“The petitioners allege that the EPA's rulemaking procedure was flawed.”).
20
See id. at 1211, 1215 (remanding the rule to EPA for procedural defects and because EPA failed to
articulate a “reasoned basis” for the rule).
21
See id.
22
See id. at 1212–13.
23
Id. at 1219 (“Unquantified benefits can, at times, permissibly tip the balance in close cases. They
cannot, however, be used to effect a wholesale shift on the balance beam. Such a use makes a mockery of the
requirements of TSCA that the EPA weigh the costs of its actions before it chooses the least burdensome
alternative.”).
24
Id. at 1216–17 (finding that EPA violated TSCA by only comparing the benefits of a total ban on
certain asbestos uses against its continued unregulated use, rather than “calculating how many lives a less
burdensome regulation would save, and at what cost. . . [i]n order to impose a regulation at the top of the
hierarchy -- a total ban of asbestos -- the EPA must show not only that its proposed action reduces the risk of
the product to an adequate level, but also that the actions Congress identified as less burdensome also would
not do the job”).
25
See Lauren Trevisan, Human Health and the Environment Can't Wait for Reform: Current
Opportunities for the Federal Government and States to Address Chemical Risks Under the Toxic Substances
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experts, environmental groups, elected officials, and legal scholars, EPA’s inability to
prohibit the use of a substance “as obviously harmful as asbestos” revealed that TSCA was
irredeemably flawed.26 They argued that EPA had spent a decade developing an extensive
analysis to support the ban, and if this was not enough to convince a court that the benefits
of the regulation outweighed its costs,27 then EPA had no hope of regulating other existing
chemicals.28
In the aftermath of the court’s decision, members of Congress and environmental
groups called for amending the statute to give EPA greater authority to regulate toxic
substances like asbestos. However, until recently, advocates for reform were unable to
secure Republican support for new legislation.29 That changed as progressive states sought
to implement their own restrictions on toxic substances. By the 2010s, there were more
than 1,100 laws addressing chemical harms at the state-level, including bans on flame
retardants, phthalates, and numerous other chemicals.30 Because manufacturers cannot
easily change their products to meet different requirements,31 state-level chemical
regulations had a cascading impact across the country as companies reformulated their
products to meet the most stringent state standard.32 Republicans in Congress subsequently

Control Act, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 385, 401 (2011) (“The long-term result of this decision, however, is that EPA
has since never used its section 6 authority to successfully ban a chemical.”).
26
See Cristin Dale Mustillo, Persistently Present, Inconsistently Regulated: The Story of Asbestos and
the Case for A New Approach toward the Command and Control Regulation of Toxics, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 257, 279 (2013) (“The loss of the Corrosion Proof Fittings case, and thus the inability to ban a toxin as
obviously harmful as asbestos, is considered to be one of TSCA's failures.”).
27
See Oversight Hearing on the Federal Toxic Substances Control Act, Joint Hearing before the S.
Subcomm. on Superfund, Toxics, and Environmental Health & S. Committee on Environment and Public
Works, 111th Cong. 173 (2009) (hereinafter “Oversight Hearing on the Federal Toxic Substances Control
Act”) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (“[I]n spite of everything we know about the hazards of asbestos, in
spite of a 10-year analysis and a 45,000-page record produced by EPA, the Agency was precluded from
moving forward with an asbestos ban under a Court interpretation of TSCA.”).
28
See Greenwood Interview, supra note 16, at 8 (“[W]hen the rule blew up because of the legal issues,
[...] the office was completely demoralized. There were people who really weren't the same after that,
because they had worked almost ten years on something they felt desperately was important, and the office
did too. Suddenly, it was taken away.”).
29
Before 2016, TSCA was the only major environmental statute that had not been updated since its
enactment. See Ian Urbina, Think Those Chemicals Have Been Tested?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/sunday-review/think-those-chemicals-have-been-tested.html.
30
See Charles Franklin & Allison Reynolds, TSCA Reform and Preemption: A Walk on the Third Rail,
27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 1, 4 (2012).
31
See id.
32
See Sharon Lerner, Toxic “Reform” Law Will Gut State Rules on Dangerous Chemicals, THE
INTERCEPT (Jan. 11, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/01/11/toxic-reform-law-would-gut-state-rules-ondangerous-chemicals/ (“Maine’s law [the Kid Safe Product Act] turned out to be more than just a local
triumph . . . the ban on BPA [bisphenol A] nudged the whole country away from using that chemical. Rather
than just changing how it made products sold in Maine, the giant toymaker Hasbro wound up removing BPA
from all its products.”); State Environmental Officials Call on Congress to Respect States’ Role in Chemical
Safety, VERMONT DIGGER (May 20, 2016), https://vtdigger.org/2016/05/20/state-environmental-officials-callon-congress-to-respect-states-role-in-chemical-safety/ (“Far from leading to a patchwork quilt of competing
regulations, state leadership on toxics has a demonstrated track record of spurring national agreements with
manufacturers, or paving the way for federal legislation.”).
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came under pressure from the chemical industry to create preemptive, uniform federal
regulations to replace these “ill-conceived” state laws.33
Following protracted negotiations between Democrats and Republicans, Congress
finally amended TSCA in 2016 with bipartisan support in both the House and Senate.34 It
was the first time Congress had amended a major piece of environmental legislation in
twenty years, and the first time TSCA itself had ever been amended since its original
passage in 1976.35 The deal thus represented a once in a generation opportunity to address
toxic chemicals and environmental pollution more broadly.
The accepted wisdom about why EPA was unsuccessful in regulating asbestos led
Democrats to lobby for one of the biggest changes in TSCA: a new requirement
prohibiting the agency from considering “costs or other nonrisk factors” when determining
whether a chemical poses an “unreasonable risk” of harm.36 EPA is now supposed to
ascertain the reasonability of risk to human health and the environment through a process
called a “risk evaluation.”37 The agency can only consider costs and benefits at a newly
constituted “risk management” stage created after the 2016 amendments, which is when
the agency decides how to control the substance if it poses an unreasonable risk.38
To earn Republican support for these changes to section 6 and other reforms in the
law, Democrats agreed to sweeping preemption of state toxic chemical controls.39 The
33

Safe Chemicals Act of 2011, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Superfund, Toxics and Environmental
Health of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 112th Cong. 42 (2011) (statement of Cal Dooley,
President and CEO, American Chemistry Council).
34
See Jason Plautz, The Senate Finally Passed Chemical Safety Reform. Here’s How They Did It, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/the-senate-finally-passedchemical-safety-reform-heres-how-they-did-it/453069/.
35
The last major amendments were to the Clean Air Act in 1990 and the Safe Drinking Water Act in
1996. See Legislative Hearing on the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (S. 697),
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 86–87 (2015) (hereinafter Hearing on
the Lautenberg Act) (statement of Kenneth Cook, President, Environmental Working Group).
36
15 U.S.C. §2605(c). Congress did amend other provisions of the law, such as the new chemical review
program, which are not the subject of this paper. See Bridget DiCosmo, EPA Issues First New Chemical
Safety Reviews Under Reformed TSCA Law, INSIDE EPA (July 25, 2016).
37
Richard Denison, TSCA Reform Legislation: Consideration of Costs and Other Non-risk Factors,
ENV’T DEF. BLOG (May 20, 2015), http://blogs.edf.org/health/2015/05/20/tsca-reform-legislationconsideration-of-costs-and-other-non-risk-factors/ (explaining that the Lautenberg Act “retains the term
‘unreasonable risk’ as its safety standard but, in defining the standard, explicitly precludes EPA from
considering costs and other non-risk factors in making safety determinations”).
38
Risk Management for Existing Chemicals under TSCA, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
assessing-and-managing-chemicals-under-tsca/risk-management-existing-chemicals-under-tsca#process (last
visited July 14, 2021); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).
39
While the 2016 amendments did include other reforms, the removal of cost-benefit consideration
under section 6 was one of the key changes sought by lead Democrat negotiators and major environmental
groups, as well as EPA officials. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor, The New TSCA: Balanced Compromise or
Business as Usual?, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-andenergy/the-new-tsca-balanced-compromise-or-business-as-usual (“One of the biggest victories scored by the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) in its negotiations with chemical industry leaders was a provision that
prohibits the consideration of costs during risk assessments of existing chemicals. Of course, industry got
plenty in return, from the continuation of the cost-preoccupied “unreasonable risk” standard for rule-writing
to preemption of more aggressive state regulation of substances that the EPA is evaluating.”); Bridget
DiCosmo, Vitter Drops TSCA Reform Pact After Boxer Releases Confidential Draft Plan, INSIDE EPA (Sep.
19, 2014) (describing a counter proposal by Senator Boxer that would not have included any preemption of
state toxics controls while strengthening EPA’s authority to restrict chemicals simply on finding that they
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revised statute stipulates that “when a chemical has undergone a risk evaluation and [is]
determined to pose no unreasonable risk, any state chemical management action to restrict
or regulate the substance is preempted.”40 Described as “the most contentious issue of the
negotiations as well as the most important linchpin in the final deal,” 41 the preemption
provisions led some Democrats and environmental groups to oppose the bill, as numerous
states had long set far more stringent standards than EPA.42 Despite this significant
concession, many members of Congress and advocates were hopeful that the amended
statute would improve toxic substances regulation.43
However, a close historical analysis of the 1989 asbestos ban’s failure suggests that
Democrats struck the wrong bargain in the 2016 amendments to section 6 and did not
address the underlying problems that led to EPA’s challenges in justifying the regulation.
Using internal EPA documents from the National Archives and Records Administration in
Washington D.C.,44 this paper shows that the agency’s difficulties with regulating asbestos
were not caused by the statute’s requirement to consider costs and benefits when
determining whether a substance posed an unreasonable risk.45 These materials have never
been analyzed by scholars before, with several sets released for the first time through
Freedom of Information Act requests made by the author.
First, EPA records demonstrate that a multitude of other factors were responsible
for the long, arduous process in issuing the rule, not a 10-year scientific and economic
analysis. These were primarily disagreements within the Reagan administration over
whether EPA or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) should
regulate asbestos. When the asbestos industry learned that EPA intended to restrict the
chemical, it extensively lobbied the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to stop
EPA’s efforts. OMB subsequently prevented EPA from moving forward with the ban and
forced the agency to refer asbestos to OSHA for regulation instead. These disputes over
whether to regulate under OSHA or EPA, in combination with the 1976 law’s trial-like
process for promulgating rules, were largely responsible for the extensive delays in issuing
“harm” human health or the environment); Bridget DiCosmo, Democrats' TSCA Bill Aims To Preserve
States' Role, Boost Safety Standard, INSIDE EPA (Mar. 12, 2015) (proposing compromise language changing
how EPA determines unreasonable risk without reference to costs and benefits while including some
preemption of state law); Bridget DiCosmo, EPA Eyes Senate TSCA Reform Bill Fixes But Questions State
Preemption, INSIDE EPA (Mar. 18, 2015) (explaining that EPA officials sought to persuade Congress to drop
cost-benefit considerations from unreasonable risk determinations as part of the reform efforts, while
informing Congress that the administration wanted to see certain changes to the preemption provisions to
find a compromise on section 6 reform); Compromise Senate TSCA Reform Bill Revises Preemption, 'Risk'
Language, INSIDE EPA (Apr. 28, 2015).
40
126 Cong. Rec. S3521 (daily ed. June 7, 2016).
41
Id. (statement of Sen. Inhofe).
42
See id. at S3519; Andy Igrejas, Weak Tea in a Chipped Cup: Why the New Vitter-Udall Legislation
Isn’t Just “Not Good Enough.” It’s Not Good., SAFER CHEMICALS, HEALTHY FAMILIES (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://saferchemicals.org/2015/03/11/weak-tea-in-a-chipped-cup/.
43
See Charles W. Schmidt, TSCA 2.0: A New Era in Chemical Risk Management, 124 ENV’T
HEALTH PERSP. 182, 184 (2016).
44
The National Archives and Records Administration is the main archival repository for federal
government documents and contains historical records from EPA and other administrative agencies. See
What is the National Archives and Records Administration?, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/about (last visited July 13, 2021).
45
See Sheldon Krimsky, The Unsteady State and Inertia of Chemical Regulation under the US Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 7–8 (2017).
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the ban. While the statute’s cumbersome procedures were fixed in the 2016 amendments,46
the question of whether TSCA should function as a gap-filling statute and only address
exposures not covered by other federal laws was left unresolved.
Second, EPA’s failure to justify the regulation on cost-benefit grounds was largely
a problem of its own making. EPA’s internal records reveal that the agency would, in fact,
have been able to show that the ban’s benefits outweighed its costs if it had fully quantified
and monetized the health benefits. Instead, EPA officials ignored risks to the general
population, excluded known health harms, and assumed that personal protective equipment
would reduce worker exposures against the judgment of many agency experts. As a result,
they vastly underestimated the number of lives that would be saved by a ban. They then
refused to place a monetary value on the small number of averted cancer deaths that were
ultimately quantified, even though standard valuation techniques at the time would have
shown that the benefits from saving these lives outweighed the costs of the rule. It was thus
the narrow the scope of EPA’s analysis and officials’ philosophical opposition to costbenefit analysis that made the ban’s costs appear to dwarf its health benefits.
These challenges in promulgating the asbestos ban—whether to regulate under
TSCA or other federal laws and how extensively to assess chemical harms—are not unique
features of cost-benefit analysis. Risk evaluations also require EPA to decide what
exposure routes to examine, what populations should be included, and whether protective
equipment can adequately safeguard workers. By making the methodology of cost-benefit
analysis the key focus of the 2016 amendments to section 6, Congress left EPA vulnerable
to these same analytical issues and value judgments when determining whether a chemical
should be regulated. Nor are risk evaluations insulated from political interference on behalf
of industry. The Trump administration, which was tasked with implementing the 2016
amendments, manipulated risk evaluations in ways that parallel many of the problems with
the 1989 asbestos ban in order to find that toxic chemicals do not pose an unreasonable
risk. Because of TSCA reform, states could now be preempted from restricting use of these
chemicals, leaving Americans unprotected.47 The compromise between Congressional
Republicans and Democrats to amend the law in exchange for state preemption was thus
not only misguided—it has given the chemical industry a way of obstructing toxic
chemical controls at all levels of government.
Despite making the case that EPA could have justified the asbestos ban on costbenefit grounds, this paper does not contend that toxics regulations are only warranted if
the quantified, monetized benefits of restrictions outweigh their costs. Nor does it advance
the normative claim that cost-benefit analysis should be our preferred method for deciding
when to regulate environmental pollutants. The paper does suggest, however, that the
demonization of cost-benefit methods and the inaccurate account of the asbestos ban
failure did incredible harm. It allowed Americans to be continually exposed to asbestos
and other toxic chemicals as EPA sat on the sidelines waiting for Congress to “fix” the
legislation. Blaming the method also obscured the actual reasons EPA prepared such a
46
See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(3) (requiring EPA to follow the standard informal rulemaking procedures
under the Administrative Procedure Act, in contrast to the earlier law that imposed additional requirements of
public hearings).
47
See Maria Hegsted, Fearing Preemption, Litigants Ask Court to Reject EPA’s Dioxane Remand,
INSIDE TSCA (July 12, 2021); Diana DiGangi, Industry Eyes Potential for First-Time TSCA Preemption
Under Biden, INSIDE TSCA (Mar. 31, 2021).
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poor analysis in support of the ban, handicapping Democrats in negotiations with
Republicans over TSCA reform. Ideally, the 2016 amendments would have created an
approach to toxic chemical regulation that put the onus on industry to show that the
economic benefits of using a chemical outweigh its health harms, a burden-shifting
approach adopted in Europe that has had much greater success.48 But in the absence of
such far-reaching reforms, Congress should have at least amended TSCA to prevent EPA
from engaging in narrow assessments of toxic chemical risks, regardless of the
methodology the agency adopted.
The paper will proceed in four parts. Part I describes the importance of the failed
asbestos ban to the campaign for TSCA reform over the last several decades and how it
subsequently influenced the 2016 amendments to the law. Part II uses archival documents
to show that the commonly accepted wisdom about why EPA struggled to promulgate the
ban is wrong. The lengthy and difficult process was not due to years spent developing a
scientific and economic basis for the regulation. Rather, EPA’s challenges with
promulgating and justifying the ban primarily resulted from OMB’s interference in the
rulemaking on behalf of the asbestos industry and EPA officials’ resistance to using costbenefit methods to justify the ban. Part III examines how these issues led EPA to put
forward a flawed cost-benefit analysis and describes how EPA could have shown that the
benefits of the ban outweighed its costs if it had better quantified and monetized avoided
cancer deaths. Part IV then argues that Democrats struck an ill-fated compromise in the
2016 amendments because they traded preemption of strong state toxics regulations
without addressing the actual problems that beset the 1989 asbestos ban. During the Trump
administration, EPA was thus able to avoid making unreasonable risk findings by ignoring
exposures under the purview of other laws and inadequately quantifying harmful health
effects for a host of toxic chemicals, which could prevent their control by the federal
government as well as states. Part IV concludes by examining how many of these problems
have continued during the Biden administration as it seeks to ban asbestos for the second
time in U.S. history, and offers several recommendations for how EPA can improve its
justifications for toxic substance controls going forward.

I
REFORMING THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
The 2016 amendments to TSCA were remarkable for achieving bipartisan support
to revise an environmental law. Mobilization for reforming TSCA required a unique
confluence of momentum from environmental organizations, which have devoted
increasing attention to the dangers of chemical substances, and industry, which feared the
growing number of state toxic chemical regulations.
The competing environmental and industry pressures were each important in
shaping the final structure of the reforms. For environmental groups, one of the most
important parts of the statute to amend was section 6, which granted EPA authority to
48

See Ágnes Botos, John D. Graham & Zoltán Illés, Industrial chemical regulation in the European Union
and the United States: a comparison of REACH and the amended TSCA, 22 J. RISK RSCH 1187, 1194 (2019)
(explaining that the U.S. did not “put the burden on industry” to collect information and assess risks, costs
and benefits as the EU program requires).
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regulate or ban harmful chemical substances already on the market. In pressing for changes
to this portion of the law, myths about why EPA’s asbestos ban had failed to survive
judicial review strongly influenced the way environmental organizations lobbied Congress
to rewrite the law. These myths were 1) that EPA spent 10 years developing a scientific
and economic basis for the ban on asbestos, and yet still couldn’t defend it on cost-benefit
grounds, 2) that the Fifth Circuit opinion in Corrosion Proof Fittings had imposed an
infeasible analytic burden on the agency, making it impossible for EPA to revise the rule,
and 3) that because EPA couldn’t defend its asbestos regulation using a cost-benefit
analysis, it was necessary to remove the statute’s requirement to consider costs and
benefits when determining whether a substance poses an “unreasonable risk.”49 For
industry, it was crucial to facilitate a “cohesive approach” to chemical regulation,50 and
prevent states from more stringently controlling toxic substances.
This part explores how these two impulses shaped the 2016 TSCA amendments to
section 6. Before assessing the historical evidence for why EPA struggled to promulgate
the regulation and the Fifth Circuit’s review of the rule—addressed in Parts II and III—it is
essential to first have a clear understanding of how the asbestos episode played such an
important role in TSCA reform and what lawmakers thought they were fixing in the 2016
amendments. To that end, Section A examines the ways in which EPA’s unsuccessful
asbestos ban permeated debates about how to reform TSCA’s provisions governing
existing chemicals. Section B explains the key amendments to section 6 and how they were
expected to strengthen existing chemical regulation. Finally, Section C describes the major
compromise in the legislation over federal preemption of state toxic substance controls
should EPA find that a chemical does not pose an unreasonable risk under section 6.
A. The Influence of EPA’s Failed Asbestos Regulation on TSCA Reform
EPA’s 1989 asbestos regulation played a central role in calls for TSCA reform for
more than two decades. Government officials and environmental organizations repeatedly
expressed concerns that the failed asbestos ban revealed fundamental flaws with the way
the statute instructed EPA to regulate toxic substances. As a result, Congress returned over
and over to the events surrounding the asbestos episode to advocate for specific reforms to
the legislation. These Congressional discussions, however, have been based on a series of
assumptions about why EPA struggled to promulgate the regulation, why the court
invalidated the asbestos ban, and why EPA subsequently took no further action to control
asbestos or other harmful substances.
Immediately following the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in 1991, members of Congress
expressed concern that Corrosion Proof Fittings would seriously hinder EPA’s authority to
regulate toxic substances.51 EPA officials initially told Congress that the asbestos ban was
49

Infra Part I.A.
Hearing on the Lautenberg Act, supra note 35, at 238 (Letter from National Association of Chemical
Distributors to Senators Inhofe, Udall, and Vitter (Mar. 17, 2015)); see also id. at 239 (Letter from
International Fragrance Association North America, to Senators Inhofe, Udall, and Vitter (Mar. 17, 2015))
(praising the final Lautenberg Act amendments to TSCA for reasserting federal control over toxics
regulation).
51
See Implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Toxic
Substances, Environmental Oversight, Research and Development of the S. Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 102nd Cong. 26 (1992) (hereinafter “Implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act”)
50
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“not a dead issue” and that they expected to revisit the rule in light of the opinion.52 But
with little progress from the agency, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works convened a series of hearings in 1994 on why TSCA had not lived up to its
potential, becoming “EPA’s biggest underachiever.”53 In testimony during these hearings,
EPA officials began to claim that two key problems led to the agency’s failure to ban
asbestos and would prevent EPA from regulating other existing chemicals in the future.
First, they argued that the court’s opinion set an unrealistically high evidentiary bar for
EPA to demonstrate that a chemical posed an unreasonable risk of harm.54 Second, they
stated that it would be impossible for the agency to meet “the court’s interpretation of least
burdensome alternative” using cost-benefit analysis.55 Legislators, scientists, and
environmental advocates concluded that Congress would need to directly respond to the
Corrosion Proof Fittings decision or risk tying EPA’s hands completely for other toxic
chemicals.56

(statement of Senator Joseph Liberman) (“The recent Fifth Circuit Court decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings
v. EPA, which vacates the EPA ban on asbestos, may seriously impact EPA's section 6(a) authority to
regulate existing toxic substances. Despite the acknowledged danger of asbestos, the Fifth Circuit held that
the EPA failed to adequately consider the comparative safety of substitutes, the economic impact of a ban,
and the possibility of less burdensome alternatives. I am concerned that this decision may make the Agency
less willing or less able to properly regulate dangerous substances which are already on the market like
lead.”); see also How Safe Is Safe Enough? Risk Assessment and the Regulatory Process, Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 103rd Congress, 57 (1993) (hereinafter “How Safe Is Safe
Enough? Hearing”) (Report of the Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment Improving Regulatory
Decision Making) (“The asbestos decision has provoked considerable debate, and fingers have been pointed
in several directions. Regardless of whether the statute, the courts, the agency, or others should be faulted in
this case, it is unsettling that that EPA could not satisfy TSCA's requirements for promulgating a single rule
after a decade's effort. The case raises numerous questions, including whether the executive branch should
encourage Congress to revise this legislation, and under what circumstances the agency should devote such a
vast amount of time and resources to a single substance at the expense of many other pressing issues in its
jurisdiction.”).
52
Implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 51, at 33 (statement of Linda J.
Fisher, Assistant Administrator, Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, EPA).
53
Reauthorization of the Toxic Substances Control Act, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Toxic
Substances, Research and Development of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103rd Cong. 3
(1994) (hereinafter “Reauthorization of the Toxic Substances Control Act”) (statement of Rep. Michael L.
Synar).
54
See id. at 16 (statement of Peter Guerrero, Director, Environmental Protection Issues, General
Accounting Office) (“The EPA believes that TSCA's standards of evidence are very high, and the courts have
in fact confirmed that view in the recent asbestos case. In this instance, the EPA felt that it had considerable
scientific evidence of the serious health effects of asbestos, but despite this, it was still unsuccessful in
convincing the court that it had met the standards of evidence required under the Act.”).
55
See id. at 7 (statement of Lynn Goldman, Assistant Administrator, Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic
Substances, EPA).
56
See id. at 45 (statement of Rep. Michael L. Synar) (arguing that Congress must “address the issues
raised by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in the Asbestos case, or else risk having
an unworkable program for existing chemicals under section 6”); see also id. at 64 (statement of Ellen
Silbergeld, Senior Toxicologist, Environmental Defense Fund) (arguing that the Corrosion Proof Fitting
interpretation of the substantial evidence standard and least burdensome requirement, as well as their
conclusion that determinations of unreasonable risk require cost-benefit analysis, have made TSCA
unworkable).
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At Congress’s request, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) subsequently
published a detailed assessment of EPA’s ability to regulate toxic chemicals.57 The report
focused on the agency’s failure to ban asbestos and the implications of the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion for proper implementation of TSCA.58 EPA officials told the GAO that given “the
court decision in the asbestos case, EPA most likely will not attempt to issue regulations
under section 6 for comprehensive bans or restrictions on chemicals.”59 According to EPA,
the requirement to consider costs and benefits when determining unreasonable risk
prevented the agency from acting to regulate toxics “because the costs can be extensive
and the full range of benefits may be difficult to document.”60 The GAO subsequently
placed TSCA reform on its “high risk list of items needing attention” from Congress.61
When serious efforts to amend the statute began during the Obama administration,
the failed asbestos ban again loomed over the proceedings.62 Proponents of reform, notably
Senator Frank Lautenberg, pushed to draft legislation specifically designed to remedy the
purported problems stemming from the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision. The early
versions of the bill therefore struck the “least burdensome” requirement and eliminated
cost-benefit considerations from determining the reasonability of risk.63 Officials in the
57

The hearings were held in the summer of 1994; the report was published in September that same year.
The GAO prepared the analysis at the behest of Senator Harry Reid, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Toxic Substances, Research and Development, and Congressman Mike Synar, then Chairman of
Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO/RCED-94-103, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES COULD MAKE THE ACT
MORE EFFECTIVE (1994) (hereinafter “GAO 1994 TSCA Report”).
58
See id. at 20.
59
Id. at 21.
60
Id. at 3. GAO specifically cites to the asbestos failure in making this claim. (“Although EPA had
considerable evidence of serious health problems and spent several years developing a rule to phase out the
use of nearly all products containing asbestos, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 1991 that the
agency had issued the rule on the basis of insufficient evidence.”).
61
See Prioritizing Chemicals for Safety Determination, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 23 (2009)
(hereinafter “Prioritizing Chemicals for Safety Determination Hearing”) (statement from Steve Owens,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, U.S. EPA) (“The problems
with TSCA are so significant that the GAO has put TSCA on its high-risk list of items needing attention.”).
62
See, e.g., Prioritizing Chemicals for Safety Determination Hearing, supra note 61, at 17 (statement of
Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky) (“Today's hearing will provide important insight into how TSCA can be
amended so that the EPA does have the authority to immediately restrict or ban the use of chemicals like
asbestos that we already know poses substantial risk to the public safety. I think a lot of people are surprised
that it isn't banned already.”); Oversight Hearing on the Federal Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note
27, at 173 (statement of Rep. Max Baucus) (“[I]n spite of everything we know about the hazards of asbestos,
in spite of a 10-year analysis and a 45,000-page record produced by EPA, the Agency was precluded from
moving forward with an asbestos ban under a Court interpretation of TSCA.”); See Revisiting the Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 111th Congress 119 (2009) (“Many proponents of TSCA reform point to one
specific case (Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (Fifth Cir. 1991)), where EPA attempted to
ban asbestos using its authority under Section 6, as proof that TSCA does not provide EPA sufficient
authority to manage risks.”).
63
TSCA Modernization Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and the Economy of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 66 (2015) (statement of Andy Igrejas, Director, Safer
Chemicals, Healthy Families) (praising the proposed bill for striking “the least-burdensome requirement,
which was an issue in the asbestos decision” and removing cost-benefit considerations from the risk
evaluation stage).
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Obama administration EPA also viewed the removal of formal cost-benefit balancing from
risk determinations as a crucial part of revising TSCA.64 Environmental groups similarly
supported changes to cost considerations, asserting that they would address the problems
that “prevented EPA from banning asbestos.”65
As support coalesced in 2015 around a compromise bill to amend the law, EPA’s
failure to ban asbestos became a rallying cry among Democrats and Republicans who
sought to establish a new process for determining when and how to regulate toxic
chemicals.66 Environmental groups lobbied extensively for Congress to replace the law’s
“burdensome cost-benefit safety standard which prevented EPA from banning asbestos
with a pure, health-based safety standard.”67 In addition, Gina McCarthy, EPA
administrator under President Barack Obama, and William Reilley, EPA administrator
under President George H.W. Bush, both identified asbestos as “the poster child for the
failure of the T.S.C.A., sparking bipartisan support to strengthen the law,” notably by
“removing roadblocks like the cost-benefit analysis that had paralyzed the agency’s actions
on asbestos.”68 Echoing these sentiments, President Obama cited the asbestos ban failure
as the key impetus for reform at the signing ceremony for the reformed legislation.69
Assumptions about the role of cost-benefit analysis in preventing EPA from
regulating asbestos thus permeated debates about TSCA reform following the 1991
Corrosion Proof Fittings decision. As the next section shows, these beliefs shaped how
Congress changed the law in the hopes of empowering EPA to better regulate toxic
chemicals.
B. The 2016 Lautenberg Act Amendments to TSCA Section 6
The 2016 amendments, known as the Lautenberg Act, made several changes to
how EPA evaluates the risks from existing chemicals and considers the costs and benefits
of chemical regulation in response to the failed asbestos ban.70 These statutory revisions
64
Note that this did not necessarily mean no consideration of cost. These concerns were rooted in the
Corrosion Proof Fittings case. See id. at 26 (statement of Hon. James Jones, Assistant Administrator, Office
of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention, EPA) (arguing that formal cost-benefit analysis for toxic
chemicals “is a very challenging thing to do because the risks that we are looking at are often not quantifiable
but the costs almost always are, and what we got out of the Corrosion Proof case was a finding that the
Agency had to numerically determine that those benefits literally numerically were larger than the costs,
which creates--you end up with a cost-biased standard, which has been one of the problems that we have
had”).
65
Richard Denison, Legislating a Toxic Problem the Old Fashioned Way, THE HILL (Nov. 13, 2013),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/190020-legislating-a-toxic-problem-the-oldfashioned-way.
66
See Hearing on the Lautenberg Act, supra note 35, at 15 (2015) (statement from Sen. Udall) (“I think
we all agree: TSCA is fatally flawed. It has failed to ban even asbestos.”); see also id. at 78 (Republican
Senator Boozman, in questioning over the bill, sought to affirm that it would “allow the EPA to make
asbestos and similar things and other concerning chemicals a high priority” by removing the least
burdensome requirement).
67
Id. at 162 (statement of Richard A. Denison, Lead Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense Fund).
68
Gina McCarthy & William K. Reilly, Asbestos Kills Nearly 40,000 Americans a Year. Ban It., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/opinion/asbestos-epa-trump.html.
69
See id.
70
See 162 Cong. Rec. S3516 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (Detailed Analysis and Additional Views of
Democratic Members on the Motion to Concur in the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to the

13
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189677

13

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 236 [2022]

Forthcoming, Harvard Environmental Law Review, Volume 47
Please do not copy without written permission
focused on section 6 of the Act, which governs how EPA should determine if a chemical
currently in use is dangerous and, if so, how to regulate it.71
The 1976 law instructed EPA to regulate existing chemicals found to pose an
“unreasonable risk” using the “least burdensome” restrictions, considering the health and
environmental benefits of regulation as well as the economic consequences.72 The revised
statute now requires EPA to evaluate whether a chemical poses an unreasonable risk solely
using scientific evidence of health and environmental impacts, without any consideration
of costs, benefits or other “nonrisk” factors.73 It also struck the “least burdensome”
language from the law.74
These revisions to the statute in the 2016 amendments were a direct response to the
perceived evidentiary burdens on the agency following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Corrosion Proof Fittings. The House Report accompanying the final bill explicitly states
that these changes were made so EPA could “take broader regulatory action to protect
against unreasonable risks from asbestos. The Committee expects this legislation to enable
that regulatory action.”75 The Senate report accompanying the bill similarly noted that the
revisions were intended to respond to Corrosion Proof Fittings by eliminating the
consideration of costs and benefits when determining whether a risk was unreasonable.76
Once EPA finds that a chemical poses an “unreasonable risk” during a risk
evaluation, it is now mandated to impose restrictions on the chemical’s use “to the extent
necessary so that the chemical substance or mixture no longer presents such risk.”77
However, the agency must still consider the costs and benefits of various regulatory
options when deciding how to limit exposure.78 After assessing whether a substance poses
an unreasonable risk, the new law puts in place a multifactorial process to guide the agency
in deciding how stringently to regulate. EPA must assess 1) the effects of the chemical on
health and the magnitude of human exposure, 2) the effects of the chemical substance on
the environment and the magnitude of environmental exposure, 3) the benefits of the
chemical for various uses, and 4) the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of
the rule.79 In determining the economic effects of a regulation, EPA is instructed to
Bill H.R. 2576) (“The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act clearly rejects the
regulatory approach and framework that led to the failed asbestos ban and phase-out rule of 1989 in
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).”).
71
See 15 U.S.C. § 2605.
72
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2605(a)–(c) (requiring the administrator to
regulate chemical substances “to the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the least
burdensome requirements”).
73
162 Cong. Rec. S3513 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Udall) (explaining that while the old
law required EPA to “consider the costs and benefits of regulation when studying the safety of chemicals,”
EPA must now “consider only the health and environmental impacts of a chemical. If they demonstrate a
risk, EPA will have to regulate”).
74
See id.
75
H. Rep. 114–76, at 28 (2015).
76
See S. REP. NO. 114–67, at 4 (2015) (discussing Corrosion Proof Fittings and EPA’s failure to
regulate under section 6 following its failed asbestos ban, and arguing that “EPA’s application of the
‘unreasonable risk’ standard for regulatory action has been hampered by the statutory language itself, which
suggests that cost and benefit considerations must be applied to the Agency’s decisions on the health and
environmental risks posed by a chemical substance”).
77
15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
78
See id.
79
See id. § 2605(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).
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consider a subset of three factors: 1) the likely effect of the rule on the national economy,
small businesses, technological innovation, the environment, and public health, 2) the costs
and benefits of regulatory actions proposed, and 3) the cost effectiveness of the regulatory
actions proposed.80
Despite receiving bipartisan support for these reforms to section 6, a number of
Democrats were concerned that the bill did not go far enough to remedy the problems
caused by the 1991 Corrosion Proof Fittings decision.81 For instance, several Senators
feared that leaving in place the vague language of “unreasonable risk” could continue to
pose problems “for EPA actions to ban or restrict exposure to toxic substances.”82 The
statute still does not define the term, only specifying that “cost or other nonrisk factors”
cannot determine reasonableness.83
C. Federal Preemption of State Toxics Regulation
The original 1976 statute had a preemption provision that prevented states from
controlling chemicals that were subject to federal regulation in most circumstances.84 But
importantly, the law allowed states to completely prohibit a chemical’s use regardless of
the type of controls EPA imposed.85 It also provided states the option to seek a waiver
from EPA to simply regulate more stringently so long as they did not unduly burden
interstate commerce.86
Given these exceptions to preemption and EPA’s general lack of attention to
controlling existing chemicals after Corrosion Proof Fittings, the issue only took on
renewed importance as the chemical industry pressed for more robust preemption in the
2016 amendments.87 At the time, “thirty-eight states had enacted at least one statute that
regulated the manufacture, distribution, labeling, or use of chemicals and the products
containing specific substances.”88 These included chemicals like flame retardants, which
are carcinogenic, and bisphenol A (BPA), an endocrine disruptor.89 As discussed
previously, industry began pressing for broad, preemptive national legislation during the

80

See id. § 2605(c)(2)(A)(iv)(I)–(III).
See S. REP. NO. 114–67, at 37 (2015) (Minority Views of Boxer, Cardin, Sanders, Gillibrand, and
Markey on S. 697, as Reported by the EPW Committee)
82
Id. Several representatives and environmental organizations had lobbied to replace unreasonable risk
with “reasonable certainty of no harm,” which was viewed as a more stringent safety standard. See Hearing
on the Lautenberg Act, supra note 35, at 87.
83
Timothy Malloy, The Unreasonable Risk of TSCA Reform: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place,
LEGALPLANET (Mar. 20, 2015), https://legal-planet.org/2015/03/20/the-unreasonable-risk-of-tsca-reform/
(questioning how EPA will determine what is an “unreasonable risk” under the amended law when the term
“essentially calls for balancing the harm of the substance to society against the cost to society of restricting or
prohibiting its use”).
84
See Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2617.
85
See id. at § 2617(a)(2)(B)(iii).
86
See id. at § 2617(b).
87
See David R. Sheaffer, TSCA Reform, Preemption, and Manufacturer Influence: Does the New Law
Hang States Out to Dry? 11 (2017) (Unpublished J.D. seminar paper, Michigan State University) (noting that
prior to the 2016 amendments, the 1976 law’s preemption provisions were unused).
88
Id. at 12.
89
See id.
81
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Obama administration in response to these state initiatives, which opened the door for
bipartisan negotiations on the 2016 amendments.90
However, Congressional representatives from states with robust regulatory
programs initially balked at placing all authority for toxic chemicals at EPA.91 For
example, Senator Barbara Boxer, whose home state of California had one of the strongest
state toxics regulatory programs, called the proposed legislation “worse than the existing
statute” because of its “aggressive preemption of state law.”92 An early draft bill backed by
the chemical industry would have preempted any state action as soon as EPA began a
study of a high priority chemical, even though the 1976 law only preempted state
regulation after federal standards were put in place.93 It would have also restricted state coenforcement of federal standards,94 and some feared the preemption provisions could apply
beyond state toxics regulations to other environmental laws such as clean air and water
statutes.95
Opposition to the proposed preemption provisions was so significant that the bill’s
sponsors eventually hammered out new language to forge a compromise with Senators and
Representatives from states with extensive toxics regulations, though some Democrats still
declined to vote for the bill over this issue.96 The final legislation gives states the
opportunity to regulate a chemical for a period of time after EPA begins to study its risks,
avoiding a situation where EPA might be studying a chemical for years while preventing
states from implementing any restrictions.97 The drafters also agreed to maintain the
original 1976 law’s exceptions to federal preemption for states that sought waivers from
the federal government.98 In addition, the law grandfathered in restrictions that were
enacted before its passage, preserving the work states had done to date on a host of toxic

90

See American Chemistry Council, ACC Welcomes Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st
Century Act, (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.americanchemistry.com/Media/PressReleasesTranscripts/ACCnews-releases/ACC-Welcomes-Frank-R-Lautenberg-Chemical-Safety-for-the-21st-Century-Act.html
(praising the bill for offering the “predictability, consistency and certainty that manufacturers and the
national marketplace need, while also strengthening oversight and providing consumers with more
confidence in the safety of chemicals”).
91
See Sheaffer, supra note 87, at 16.
92
S. Hrg. 114–25, at 10 (Mar. 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (noting that the following
groups opposed the initial bill for these and other reasons: 1) State Attorneys General from California,
Massachusetts, New York, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Oregon, Washington, 2) Breast Cancer Fund, 3)
Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization, 4) Trevor’s Trek Foundation, 5) Environmental Working Group,
6) EarthJustice, 7) Safer Chemicals, Health Families, 8) Association of Women’s Health, Obstetric and
Neonatal Nurses, 9) American Nurses Association, 10) Physicians for Social Responsibility, 11) United
Steelworkers).
93
See id. at 79, 83, 105.
94
See id. at 79.
95
See id. at 179 (remarks from Attorney General Brian Frosh of Maryland, objecting to the preemption
provisions in the proposed legislation).
96
See 126 Cong. Rec. S3519 (daily ed. June 7, 2016).
97
See S. REP. NO. 114–67, at 5 (2015). See also 162 Cong. Rec. S3511 (June 7, 2016) (statement by Sen.
Barbara Boxer) (explaining that “when EPA announces the chemicals they are studying, the States still have
up to a year and a half to take action on these particular chemicals to avoid preemption until the EPA takes
final action . . . [f[or chemicals that industry has asked EPA to study, we made sure that States are not
preempted until EPA issues a final restriction on the chemical”).
98
See id. at 5–6; see also Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2617.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/236
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189677

16

Rothschild:

Rothschild

UNREASONABLE RISK

2022

compounds.99 Finally, it afforded states more authority as co-enforcers of federal
regulations and specified that the preemption provisions did not apply to other types of
state environmental laws.100
While these concessions did lessen the preemptive effects of TSCA reform, the
statute still places states at the mercy of EPA in several important respects. Should EPA
find that a chemical use does not pose an unreasonable risk, states are now prohibited from
taking any action on that same use.101 This is true even if EPA determines that a substance
is highly hazardous but finds that some particular uses of a chemical do not pose an
unreasonable risk.102
The compromise likely appeared palatable to Congressional Democrats and many
environmental advocates because of their faith in the amendments’ science only, healthbased standard for determining unreasonable risk.103 After all, if it was primarily costbenefit analysis that doomed the agency’s ability to regulate existing chemicals—an
assumption that clearly permeated TSCA reform—then fixing that aspect of the law along
with other issues like cumbersome procedures, poor data collection, and insufficient
resources would seem worth the tradeoff.104 Yet the science of risk assessment is not
divorced from important social, political, and ethical value judgments, nor immune from
manipulations intended to minimize toxic chemical risks.105 By exaggerating what can be
determined through scientific research, agencies can avoid accountability for decisions that
are actually based on other factors.106 And as the next part will show, it was disagreements
about other such factors that ultimately doomed EPA’s asbestos regulation.

162 Cong. Rec. S3511 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (“State or local restrictions on a chemical that were in
place before April 22, 2016, will not be preempted.”).
100
See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii), (iv).
101
See id. § 2617(a)(1)(B).
102
See 162 Cong. Rec. S3519–20 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (Senator Inhofe, in responding to a
hypothetical scenario where an EPA risk management rule only restricted some conditions of use, explained
that states would be preempted from taking action as to the unregulated conditions of use).
103
See id. at S3513 (statement from Sen. Tom Udall) (“Today, the old law requires that the EPA
consider the costs and benefits of regulation when studying the safety of chemicals. Very soon, EPA will
have to consider only the health and environmental impacts of a chemical. If they demonstrate a risk, EPA
will have to regulate.”)
104
See id. at S3512 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (stating in support of the final bill “even the
standard for evaluating whether a chemical is dangerous is far better than in the old TSCA. The bill requires
EPA to evaluate chemicals based on risks, not costs, and considers the impact on vulnerable populations.
This is really critical. The old law was useless. So all of these fixes make this bill better than current Federal
law”).
105
The assumption that scientific studies can be translated in a straightforward, value-free way to the
regulatory process has been dismantled by a plethora of science studies scholars and historians of science.
See generally SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 232 (1998)
(discussing how decisions about acceptable levels of risk typically involve social and political values, even
though scientific advisory committees are often the ones tasked with setting unreasonable risk standards).
106
Scholars have noted that this issue has been especially problematic in the toxics context. See, e.g.,
Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995)
(arguing that failures in toxics regulation “are at least partly attributable to a pervasive ‘science charade,’
where agencies exaggerate the contributions made by science in setting toxic standards in order to avoid
accountability for the underlying policy decisions”).
99
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II
DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT THE ASBESTOS REGULATION
One of the most pernicious myths about EPA’s 1989 asbestos ban is that the
agency spent ten years and enormous resources developing a scientific and economic basis
for the rulemaking.107 If a “10-year analysis” wasn’t enough to justify banning one of the
most dangerous substances on the market,108 then EPA had no hope of regulating other
existing chemicals.109
This Part will use original EPA source material from the National Archives and
Records Administration in Washington D.C. to argue that this characterization of the
agency’s challenges in promulgating the regulation is highly misleading, if not outright
false. As noted, these materials have never been analyzed in the academic literature before,
with several sets released for the first time through Freedom of Information Act requests.
They include agency memoranda, private correspondence, meeting notes, and technical
data.
Internal EPA records reveal that there were three primary factors that contributed to
delays in issuing the rule and difficulties in developing sufficient evidence for a ban. These
were the statute’s lengthy procedural requirements, OMB’s insistence that EPA refer
asbestos to OSHA for regulation, and EPA officials’ opposition to using cost-benefit
methods to quantify and monetize the health benefits of the rule. The influence of these
problems on development of the rule suggests that removing cost-benefit considerations
from determining what constitutes an unreasonable risk will not help EPA more quickly
and stringently regulate toxic chemicals.
The agency’s struggles to promulgate the rule in the face of TSCA’s lengthy
procedural requirements and political interference are discussed in Section A. Section B
then examines OMB’s obstruction of the rulemaking, revealing how OMB tried to prevent
EPA action by forcing the agency to refer asbestos to OSHA for regulation. These two
issues—the statute’s cumbersome procedures and OSHA’s temporary usurpation of
asbestos regulation—were largely responsible for the long delay in promulgating the ban,
rather than extensive time spent developing an evidentiary record through cost-benefit
analysis. In fact, as discussed in Section C, EPA officials were deeply skeptical about the
value of performing a cost-benefit analysis at all. Their subsequent battle with OMB over
using cost-benefit methods contributed to the impasse over issuing the rule. While
107
See, e.g., GAO 1994 TSCA Report, supra note 57, at 3 (stating that although EPA had “considerable
evidence” of the health harms from asbestos and spent many years developing the rule, “the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided in 1991 that the agency had issued the rule on the basis of insufficient evidence”);
see also How Safe Is Safe Enough? Hearing, supra note 51, at 57 (“Regardless of whether the statute, the
courts, the agency, or others should be faulted in this case, it is unsettling that that EPA could not satisfy
TSCA's requirements for promulgating a single rule after a decade’s effort.”).
108
Oversight Hearing on the Federal Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 27, at 173 (statement of
Sen. Max Baucus) (“[I]n spite of everything we know about the hazards of asbestos, in spite of a 10-year
analysis and a 45,000-page record produced by EPA, the Agency was precluded from moving forward with
an asbestos ban under a Court interpretation of TSCA.”).
109
See Greenwood Interview, supra note 16, at 8 (“[W]hen the rule blew up because of the legal issues,
[...] the office was completely demoralized. There were people who really weren't the same after that,
because they had worked almost ten years on something they felt desperately was important, and the office
did too. Suddenly, it was taken away.”).
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Congressional intervention eventually allowed EPA to move forward with the regulation,
EPA’s philosophical objections to monetizing health benefits and the Reagan
administration’s politization of the methodology set the agency up to provide an
unconvincing record in support of the ban.
A. TSCA’s False Start: Procedural and Political Delays
At the time EPA began work on the asbestos regulation in the late 1970s,
considerable scientific research existed about the chemical’s dangers.110 And EPA
officials, in part recognizing the precedent setting nature of the rulemaking, devoted
significant personnel and resources to amassing evidence of asbestos’s health effects.111
The agency developed a health dataset that spanned decades of study, providing a link
between the substance and cancer that was “among the strongest ever seen.”112
But although it is important to acknowledge the substantial effort involved in
collecting and analyzing scientific data for the regulation alongside extensive analyses of
substitutes, it is simply not the case that EPA spent ten years doing such work. After EPA
issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in 1979,113 political machinations and
procedural roadblocks—not technical research—prevented EPA from finalizing the ban
until a decade later.
President Reagan’s election to the White House in 1980 and his administration’s
subsequent attempts to restrict environmental regulations were a decisive factor in delaying
issuance of the asbestos regulation.114 Reagan, who had campaigned against government
overreach by federal bureaucracies like EPA, adopted a strong anti-regulatory policy on
environmental pollution.115 During the early years of his administration, Ann Gorsuch
served as EPA administrator and filled agency positions with staff from regulated
industries.116
Under the direction of Administrator Gorsuch and other Reagan appointees, EPA
halted efforts to regulate asbestos. Instead, from 1981 through 1983, the agency attempted

110

See Mark R. Powell, The 1983-84 Suspensions of EDB under FIFRA and the 1989 Asbestos Ban and
Phaseout Rule under TSCA: Two Case Studies in EPA's Use of Science, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 16
(Mar. 1997) (explaining that scientific evidence of asbestos-related cancers had emerged as early as 1907;
studies expanded considerably after a 1964 landmark paper on high rates of mesothelioma and other cancers
in New York City insulation workers exposed to asbestos).
111
See Greenwood Interview, supra note 16, at 8.
112
Powell, supra note 110, at 16, 23.
113
See Consumer Product Safety Commission & EPA, Commercial and Industrial Use of Asbestos
Fibers and Consumer Products Containing Asbestos; Statement of Policy on Coordination of Regulatory
Activities, 44 Fed. Reg. 60056 (Oct. 17, 1979).
114
See James V. Aidala, interviewed by Jody A. Roberts and Kavita D. Hardy, in Washington, D.C.
(May 20, 2010), Oral History Transcript 0660, Science History Institute, at 6 (“If [James E.] Carter [Jr.] had
been reelected, you had another four years to find your feet. But when Reagan came in, it was…it wasn’t
just, like, ‘stop doing that.’ It was a real, initially, a real anti-EPA push.”).
115
See Leif Fredrickson et al., History of US Presidential Assaults on Modern Environmental Health
Protection, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S95, S96 (2018).
116
See Brady Dennis and Chris Mooney, Neil Gorsuch’s Mother Once Ran the EPA. It Didn’t Go Well.,
WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017
/02/01/neil-gorsuchs-mother-once-ran-the-epa-it-was-a-disaster/.
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to reach a voluntary agreement with the asbestos industry to phase out the substance.117 As
a result, the only serious progress EPA appears to have made under Gorsuch’s tenure
occurred in 1982, when the agency used its authority under TSCA’s section 8 to gather
data on asbestos manufacturing, employee exposure, and disposal in order to inform its
assessments of the “risks and benefits” of regulation.118
After Gorsuch was forced to resign amid mounting scandals,119 William
Ruckelshaus took over the agency and brought in John “Jack” Moore, a toxicologist by
training, to head the office’s toxics and pesticide programs.120 It was only then, in late
1983, that momentum began to build around proposing an asbestos regulation. The
following spring, EPA was ready to propose two separate rules that together would ban
nearly all uses of asbestos.121
To proceed with the rulemakings, however, EPA first had to receive clearance from
OMB. Shortly after taking office, President Reagan had issued Executive Order 12,291,
which required agencies to complete a “regulatory impact analysis” for all “major”
rules.122 As part of this analysis, agencies were expected to conduct an assessment of the
rule’s costs and benefits.123 Crucially, the order gave OMB authority to review the
agency’s analysis and prevent issuance of the regulation if it concluded that the benefits
did not outweigh the costs. In compliance with this directive, in the spring and summer of
1984 EPA submitted its two asbestos regulations for OMB review.124 The agency hoped to
publish the first rule by that summer.125 Had EPA been able to propose these rules after the
60-day review process detailed in Executive Order 12,291,126 there is no reason to believe

117

See Letter from Congressman John Dingell to Lee M. Thomas, EPA administrator (Sep. 26, 1988),
Folder “Chairman John D. Dingell,” Asbestos/General FY/1989, National Archives Identifier: 72052296,
Box 1 of 7, at 1.
118
EPA, Asbestos: Manufacturing, Processing, Importation, and Distribution, in Commerce Prohibitions
(n.d., likely spring 1984), Folder “March 2 – 30, 1984,” Controlled and Major Correspondence of Assistant
Administrator John Moore, ca. 10/1983 - ca. 8/1988, National Archives Identifier: 76018974 (archival
holdings hereinafter “Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier 76018974”), Box 2 of 13, at 7.
119
See Fredrickson et al., supra note 115, at S97–S98.
120
See Powell, supra note 110, at 29, 33 (noting that Moore became a key decisionmaker in
promulgating the ban).
121
See Memorandum from John A. Moore to the Administrator, Subject: Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking Banning Certain Uses of Asbestos—Action Memorandum (Mar. 21, 1984), Folder “March 2 –
30, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 2 of 13, at 2–3 (hereinafter
“Memorandum from John A. Moore to the Administrator”).
122
Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128–30 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601.
123
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2278 (2001).
124
See Administrator’s Status Briefing on Asbestos (May 10, 1984), Folder “May 1–18, 1984”, Moore
Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 3 of 13.
125
See Letter from John A. Moore to John D. Wynkoop (May 24, 1984), Folder “May 18–31, 1984,”
Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 3 of 13.
126
See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(e)(2), 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-30 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601.
However, the executive order provides that agencies may not issue the rule until OMB concludes its review,
and OMB frequently used this power to delay rules during the Reagan Administration. See Robert V.
Percival, Rediscovering the Limits of the Regulatory Review Authority of the Office of Management and
Budget, 17 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10017, 10020 (1987) (finding that EPA frequently missed
statutory deadlines during the Reagan administration because of OMB’s extended review under 12,291).
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that its promulgation timeline would have been out of line with other major environmental
regulations.127
OMB officials became adamantly opposed to issuing a ban on asbestos after
receiving EPA’s regulatory impact analysis in March 1984 due to lobbying by the asbestos
industry. As detailed infra in Sections B and C, OMB subsequently informed EPA that the
chemical was more appropriately managed through OSHA standards rather than an
outright ban. OMB then held EPA’s regulation past the 60-day review period specified
under Executive Order 12,291 and refused to send the rule back to the agency for further
work or release it for publication in the Federal Register.128
Officially, OMB claimed EPA had voluntarily withdrawn the rule “on legal
grounds,”129 offering a dubious legal interpretation of TSCA that gave the agency no
discretion on when to refer toxic substances to other agencies for regulation. But
informally, OMB told EPA that the regulation was being held up because it did not
consider the ban to be “cost-effective.”130 Then, in September of 1984, it made clear to
EPA staff that “OMB does not intend to release the rule.”131
OMB’s refusal to release the rules prevented EPA from moving forward with any
work on asbestos regulation for nearly two years. The agency was able to resume the
process of issuing a ban only after Congressional investigations into OMB’s actions led to
significant political pressure on the Reagan administration to allow EPA to proceed with a
rulemaking.132 Once OMB relented, EPA appears to have spent only a few months
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471,
513 (2011) (providing an empirical analysis of regulatory timelines and noting that EPA rules typically take
nearly two years between the notice of proposed rulemaking and publication of the final rule; this timeline
does not include preparation to issue the notice of proposed rulemaking). Empirical work on the entire
lifecycle for EPA rules indicates that the time necessary to prepare a notice of proposed rulemaking can be
nearly twice as long as the time between a notice of proposed rulemaking and publication of a final rule,
which would also be consistent with the timeline for the asbestos rule. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes
& Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 144 n.150, 145 (2011) (analyzing the length of the entire “life cycle” for ninety EPA
rules that are typical examples of pollution control standards promulgated by EPA).
128
See Administrator’s Status Briefing on Asbestos (Aug. 17, 1984), Folder “August 1-20, 1984,” Moore
Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13, at 1; Memorandum: Ad Hoc Group on
Asbestos, Folder “July 2–13, 1984”, Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13.
129
Letter from Robert P. Bedell, Deputy Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, to
A. James Barnes, Acting Deputy Administrator, EPA (Mar. 1985), Folder “July 13–23, 1985,” Moore
Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 8 of 13 (hereinafter “Letter from Robert P. Bedell”).
130
Memorandum: Status of Proposed Asbestos Rules (Aug. 29, 1984), Folder “August 21–31, 1984,”
Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13.
131
Memorandum: Status of Proposed Asbestos Rules, (Sep. 12, 1984), Folder “September 4–22, 1984,”
Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13.
132
Discussed infra Part II.B. OMB’s interference with EPA’s asbestos regulation led to significant
controversy in Congress over the lawfulness of Executive Order 12,291. See, e.g., OMB Review of EPA
Regulations, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong. 3 (1986) (“The asbestos case that was examined by the subcommittee last year
discloses very clearly how OMB is distorting public rulemaking procedures. It shows that OMB's claim of
noninterference is just a sham, because that was a concrete case where OMB worked actively behind the
scenes to sabotage a public and open process.”); see also id. at 4 (“In 1985, the Subcommittee's hearing and
report on EPA's asbestos regulations chronicled OMB's secret and heavy-handed interference with two draft
proposed EPA rules designed to protect workers, consumers, and the general public against the cancer risks
posed by ongoing asbestos production, use, and disposal. The report concluded that OMB's interference in
EPA’s asbestos rulemakings pursuant to Executive Order 12291 constituted an unlawful abuse of power, and
127
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preparing a new, single rule before publishing it in the Federal Register on January 29,
1986.133
After proposing the regulation, EPA struggled to finalize the rule in a timely
manner given the procedural requirements of the statute. Unlike most agency rules that
must follow the notice and comment process under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),134 the 1976 statute contained language stipulating that EPA should also “provide an
opportunity for an informal hearing.”135 Any interested person was allowed to orally
present evidence concerning the rule at the hearing.136 Furthermore, the statute specified
that if the Administrator found there were “disputed issues of material fact,” EPA must
allow “cross-examination” to resolve the matter.137
The agency’s legal advisors at the time did not believe the above provisions
required a trial type hearing or much departure from the typical notice-and-comment
requirements of the APA.138 However, EPA officials wanted to be sure they fully complied
with any additional obligations under TSCA to avoid having the rule struck down on
procedural grounds.139 As a result, EPA held lengthy agency hearings in which 25 groups
gave oral testimony and EPA officials made themselves available for nine days of crossexamination.140
Although the rule may have benefitted from the extensive public engagement, it
took EPA nearly three years to complete the process of oral hearings, public comment, and
further rule revision.141 These lengthy procedures underscore the inaccuracy of depicting
EPA’s attempt to regulate asbestos as simply the result of scientific study and expert
analysis. Together with the earlier attempt to reach a voluntary agreement with industry
under Administrator Gorsuch and OMB’s refusal to release the regulation, they consumed
nearly seven of the ten years between the initial advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
it underscored the inadequacy of OMB’s policies governing the disclosure of communications with outside
parties and agency officials.”).
133
See EPA, Asbestos; Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing,
Importation, and Processing Prohibitions, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738 (Jan. 29, 1986); see also Philip Shabecoff,
E.P.A. Proposes Plan to Curb Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1986) at A12 (noting that “[t]he environmental
agency first proposed regulating asbestos in 1979. Regulations like those in the program proposed today were
drafted two years ago. Promulgation of the regulations were delayed, however, in large part because of a
variety of objections by the White House Office of Management and Budget”).
134
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
135
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2605(c)(2)(C).
136
See id. at § 2605(c)(3)(A)(i).
137
Id. at § 2605(c)(3)(A)(ii).
138
See Legal Support Document for Proposed Procedures for Rulemaking under Section 6 of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 42 Fed. Reg. 20,640 (Apr. 21, 1977), Folder “Support Document”, Regulations,
Standards, and Guidelines Files Relating to Section 6 Docket Rulemaking under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), 1983 – 1990, National Archives Identifier: 6863764, Box 1 of 7, at 3–4.
139
At the time, the Asbestos Information Association (AIA) had accused EPA of not sufficiently
disclosing the costs and benefits of the rule as required by TSCA. EPA subsequently made numerous
concessions to AIA during the comment period of the rulemaking, such as allowing extensive questioning
and cross-examination of agency officials and health experts. See Draft Letter from Lee M. Thomas to
Edward W. Warren (Feb. 11, 1987), Folder “February 1–27, 1987,” Moore Papers, National Archives
Identifier: 76018974, Box 12 of 13.
140
See Letter from John A. Moore to Senator Alan J. Dixon (Dec. 31, 1987), Folder “Honorable Alan J.
Dixon,” Asbestos/General FY/1989, National Archives Identifier: 72052296, Box 1 of 7, at 1.
141
See id. (noting that the public comment period on the additional documents submitted in support of
the regulation closed on October 18, 1988).
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and finalization of the rule. Accounting for these issues demonstrates that scientific and
technical work was not a major hindrance to promulgating the rule in a timely fashion, as
many have claimed.
B. OMB Interference in the Asbestos Regulation
EPA’s decision to reinitiate work on the asbestos rulemakings after the resignation
of Administrator Gorsuch in 1983 prompted a significant backlash among industry groups
and the Canadian government, as the province of Quebec owned a considerable stake in
asbestos companies.142 After EPA submitted its proposed rulemakings to OMB in 1984,
the Asbestos Information Association, a trade group representing asbestos manufacturers,
began privately lobbying OMB officials to stop EPA from regulating the chemical. 143 The
Canadian embassy embarked on a similar campaign shortly thereafter.144
The Asbestos Information Association, in meetings with both OMB and EPA,
adopted a two-pronged attack on EPA’s asbestos regulation. First, it asserted that it was
more appropriate for OSHA to adopt workplace safety standards rather than allow EPA to
completely ban the chemical.145 Second, it claimed that any remaining residual health
effects from asbestos not covered by workplace controls “cannot reasonably be considered
per se unreasonable risks,” as other occupational risks from accidents, radiation exposure,
and other hazards were far higher.146
OMB officials, who had already developed a reputation for interfering with
environmental rulemakings through Executive Order 12,291, latched onto the argument
that OSHA workplace controls could alleviate any need for EPA to act.147 Along with the
asbestos industry, they argued that the 1976 statute required EPA to refer chemicals to
other agencies for regulation if the risks could be sufficiently reduced under other federal
laws.148
Congress had directly addressed the relationship between TSCA and other statutes
in the 1976 legislation, recognizing that many chemicals might fall under the jurisdictions
of other laws because of their presence in the workplace, air, water, cosmetics, and so
142

See Memorandum from John A. Moore to the Administrator, supra note 121, at 5.
See EPA’s Asbestos Regulations, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 233 (1985) (hereinafter “Hearing on EPA’s Asbestos
Regulations”) (listing a series of letters and phone conversations between the Asbestos Information
Association and OMB officials after EPA submitted the first of its two rulemakings for review per E.O.
12,291).
144
See id. at 234–35 (noting meetings between Canadian diplomats and OMB officials about the
asbestos rulemakings).
145
See Letter from Edward W. Warren, Kirkland and Ellis, to John A. Moore (May 14, 1984), Folder
“July 2 – 13, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13, at 2 (writing on
behalf of the Asbestos Information Association and describing arguments against the asbestos regulation
made to OMB and EPA in the spring of 1984).
146
Id. at 3.
147
See Hearing on EPA’s Asbestos Regulations, supra note 143, at 2 (describing Congress’s concern
from 1981 to 1984 that OMB was improperly influencing and obstructing EPA’s regulations).
148
See Letter from Robert P. Bedell, supra note 129, at 4 (“Section 9 does not allow EPA to disregard
the referral mechanism on its own conclusion that comprehensive, unilateral regulatory action by EPA would
be ‘most effective’ . . . Congress decided that TSCA is a ‘gap-filling’ statute and that other agencies have
primary regulatory jurisdiction for risks within their respective authorities. Under the law, therefore, EPA
must submit such matters to those other agencies.”).
143
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forth. Section 9 of TSCA specified that if EPA concluded that a chemical posed an
unreasonable risk of harm and subsequently determined “in the Administrator's discretion”
that another agency could sufficiently reduce the risk, “the Administrator shall submit to
the agency which administers such law a report which describes such risk.”149 The agency
receiving the report was then supposed to make a finding about whether it could address
the risk and inform EPA of their determination. Should the other agency decide to take
action against the identified risk, EPA was prohibited from issuing its own regulation.150
The plain language of the statute thus gave EPA discretion to refer a chemical to
other agencies for regulation. Once it did so, however, the other agency would have
discretion about whether to move forward with a rulemaking or refer the chemical back to
EPA. This was the legal understanding of EPA and OSHA at the time EPA developed its
asbestos ban.151
However, after lobbying by the asbestos industry, OMB officials insisted that EPA
must first allow OSHA to address the issue of asbestos exposure through workplace
controls.152 It subsequently pushed OSHA to develop a new rule that would reduce
permissible exposures for workers153 through wearing personal protective equipment.154
OMB then told EPA that if its rule intended to similarly target workplace reductions,
OSHA would be the proper agency to regulate asbestos, not EPA.155
Under pressure from OMB and political appointees within EPA, in early 1985
EPA’s general counsel agreed to write a new memorandum reinterpreting section 9 to
support referring a chemical to other agencies with jurisdiction over a chemical’s risks.156
The Acting Deputy Administrator at EPA then issued a press release stating that EPA
intended to refer asbestos to OSHA because it was “mandated” by Section 9. 157 EPA and
149

Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2608(a)(1) (emphasis added).
See id. at § 2608(a)(2).
151
EPA officials had consulted with OSHA through a federal task force on asbestos on numerous
occasions during the regulation’s development. On EPA’s legal understanding of its authority, see
Memorandum: Minutes of Meeting (Mar. 26, 1984) between the Office of Toxic Substances (OTS) and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Staff Concerning OTS Asbestos Program, Folder “May 1–18,
1984”, Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 3 of 13, at 2.
152
See id.; see also EPA Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, Memorandum: Role of EPA versus
Role of OSHA in Controlling Risks due to Workplace Exposure (Apr. 12, 1984), Folder “May 1–18, 1984”,
Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 3 of 13 (advocating for EPA’s continued
involvement because OSHA was prevented from banning chemicals when substitutes were not feasible).
153
See Administrator’s Status Briefing on Asbestos (May 10, 1984), Folder “May 1–18, 1984”, Moore
Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 3 of 13.
154
There were numerous problems with using personal protective equipment to guard against asbestos
exposures, as well as questions about whether OSHA could reduce risks as dramatically as EPA given its
statutory requirements to consider economic feasibility. See Hearing on EPA’s Asbestos Regulations, supra
note 143, at 276 (submitting into the record an internal EPA memorandum that acknowledged wearing
personal protective equipment was infeasible for many workers and did not sufficiently reduce exposure even
when worn).
155
See Letter from Robert P. Bedell, supra note 129, at 4.
156
The general counsel did so under the direction of political appointees at the agency. See Hearing on
EPA’s Asbestos Regulations, supra note 143, at 390 (“EPA completely reversed its view as to its authority
and function under Section 9 in a broad policy statement issued by A. James Barnes on February 1, 1985 just
after William Ruckelshaus left his post as EPA Administrator.”); see also id. at 396 (describing a
memorandum OMB sent to the acting administrator of EPA, which stated that section 9 required a referral,
shortly before EPA reversed its position).
157
Id. at 391.
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OSHA subsequently negotiated a “memorandum of understanding” stating the
responsibilities of each agency for toxics regulation and EPA’s intent to refer asbestos
controls to OSHA under section 9 of TSCA.158 This was despite the fact that OSHA had a
very poor track record on asbestos protections and other carcinogenic chemicals since the
mid-1970s.159
The ramifications of EPA and OMB’s dispute over Section 9 were enormous. By
holding the rule hostage and refusing to let the agency revise it on “legal grounds,” OMB
was in effect exercising “veto power over proposed regulations.”160 OMB’s construal of
section 9 was especially galling given its inconsistency with the plain statutory language,
TSCA’s legislative history, and EPA’s prior legal interpretations of the provision.161 It was
also of dubious constitutionality, as Congress had vested the EPA with the authority to
interpret TSCA, not OMB.162
Though EPA was eventually able to move forward with its asbestos ban, OMB’s
dispute with EPA over how to interpret TSCA’s referral requirements demonstrates how a
hostile administration was able to use the prospect of controls through other agencies or
laws to prevent regulation under TSCA.163 Furthermore, OMB’s initial refusal to defer to
EPA’s interpretation of section 9 and insistence on proceeding first through OSHA had an
impact on EPA’s ability to justify the ban on cost-benefit grounds, as discussed in Part III,
Section A. These tactics also previewed many of the issues that arose under the Trump

158

Letter from John A. Moore, Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, to Robert
Rowland, Assistant Secretary, OSHA (Feb. 6, 1985), Folder “February 1–11, 1985,” Moore Papers, National
Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 6 of 13, at 1.
159
EPA’s section 9 referral prompted criticism from Congress and state governments. See, e.g., Letter
from Larry C. Holcomb, Executive Secretary, Michigan Toxic Substances Control Commission, to Lee M.
Thomas, EPA Administrator (Mar. 11, 1985), Folder “March 25–30, 1985,” Moore Papers, National
Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 6 of 13, at 1. Note that OSHA also had to contend with challenges in
meeting the “significant risk” threshold following the infamous Benzene case in the Supreme Court. See
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
160
Letter from J. Clarence [Terry] Davis, Executive Vice President, to John A. Moore, Assistant
Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances (Dec. 12, 1983), Folder “October 14 – December 30,
1983,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 1 of 13 (noting that he retained faith in
the civil servants working at the agency).
161
See Hearing on EPA’s Asbestos Regulations, supra note 143, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. Dingell)
(finding it galling that EPA’s “new interpretation of section 9 was apparently inspired in some divine fashion
during meetings with OMB officials”).
162
See id. at 375, 468–71 (“But this case raises even deeper concerns that relate to whether or not the
Congress or the Executive branch shall exercise policy authority as to which agency shall weigh the
standards in law which determine the manner of its application. This choice is a policy matter which rests
with the Congress and not with the Executive Branch.”). Similar constitutional concerns were raised about
the Trump E.O. 13,771. See A Debate Over President Trump’s “One-In-Two-Out” Executive Order, REG.
REV. (June 26, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/06/26/debate-one-in-two-out-executive-order/; see
also Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 38–39, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6
(D.D.C. 2018) (case ultimately dismissed for lack of standing) (arguing that “Executive Order 13771 directs
these defendants to exercise their authority in ways that are contrary to the Constitution and their governing
statutes, and that violate the bar against agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law”).
163
It’s worth noting that the issue of OMB overruling EPA on environmental regulations has also arisen
in administrations considered more predisposed to environmental protection. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling,
Inside EPA: A Former Insider's Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama
White House, 31 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 325 (2014) (describing a tense relationship between OMB and EPA
during the Obama administration).
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administration’s implementation of the 2016 amendments, which are explored more fully
in Part IV.
C. EPA and OMB’s Battle over Cost-Benefit Analysis
While the 1976 TSCA statute did contain language instructing EPA to consider the
costs and benefits of regulating, it did not explicitly require the agency to conduct a formal
cost-benefit analysis for regulating a toxic substance.164 Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291,
however, was crystal clear on the matter. It required all “major” agency rules, defined as
leading to more than $100 million in annual economic effects, to include a regulatory
impact analysis assessing the costs and benefits of the rule.165
At the time EPA officials began drafting the asbestos regulation, many of those in
charge of the rulemaking were opposed to allowing cost-benefit analysis to play a large
role in environmental regulation.166 For example, the head of EPA’s Office of Pesticides
and Toxic Substances, Jack Moore, argued to his superiors that “the role of economic
analyses in decision making needs to be put into the right perspective. It is shortsighted to
imply that economic considerations determine the regulatory decision. While they may aid
in decision making and in some statutes are actually called for, they are not the only
consideration.”167 Moore also believed that such an approach was inconsistent with TSCA,
which in his view prioritized risk reduction over costs to industry.168
EPA therefore sought to determine that asbestos posed an “unreasonable risk”
largely based on data about cancer rates following inhalation of asbestos fibers,169
emphasizing that this determination was “based on sounder science than many of our risk
predictions for other chemicals.”170 In addition, the agency pointed to two key factors that
it believed made the substance worthy of restrictions: 1) the fact that asbestos posed
dangers throughout its “life cycle,” meaning from manufacture through consumer use and

164

See Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2605(a); id. at § 2605(c)(1)(A)–(D).
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
166
At the time, there was considerable debate about how EPA should balance costs against “risk
reduction” and the degree to which this should take the form of cost-benefit analysis. See James L. Regens,
Thomas M. Dietz & Robert W. Rycroft, Risk Assessment in the Policy-Making Process: Environmental
Health and Safety Protection, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 137, 142 (1983).
167
Memorandum from John A. Moore to Milton Russell, Subject: Risk Assessment – Risk Management
Report (Sep. 27, 1984), Folder “September 24–30, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier:
76018974, Box 5 of 13, at 1.
168
See id. at 2 (arguing that “cost per risk avoided” should not be the primary determinate of how to
regulate under TSCA).
169
See EPA, Asbestos: Manufacturing, Processing, Importation, and Distribution, in Commerce
Prohibitions (undated, likely spring 1984), Folder “March 2–30, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives
Identifier: 76018974, Box 2 of 13, at 32, 53 (hereinafter “EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, Mar. 1984”) (finding
the health risks “substantially outweigh the costs to consumers and the asbestos industries from the proposed
regulation”).
170
This was largely because much of the data came from studies of human exposure, rather than relying
on extrapolations from animal studies. See Talking Points, EPA’s Comprehensive Strategy Will Reduce
Risks from Asbestos (Aug. 26, 1985), Folder “August 9–31, 1985,” Moore Papers, National Archives
Identifier: 76018974, Box 9 of 13, “Talking Points for Flip-Chart No. 4.” They also marshalled extensive
data on the lack of similar harms from substitute materials. See id. at “Talking Points for Flip-Chart No. 6.”
165
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disposal, and 2) the fact that substitute products were readily available for many asbestos
uses, meaning the “benefits to society” from asbestos “are small.”171
Rather than engage in explicit balancing between the health harms and compliance
expenses, EPA then calculated the “cost effectiveness” of an asbestos ban.172 As EPA staff
then understood the term, a cost-effective management approach assumed the desirability
of a regulatory action and “does not weigh risks against benefits, or monetize benefits; it
only looks for the least-cost path to achieve a given goal, such as the achievement of a
protective standard.”173 To determine the cost-effectiveness of its asbestos ban, EPA
calculated the cost for avoiding each incidence of cancer, which EPA determined to be
$0.83 million total for both rules.174
EPA’s decision not to undertake a formal cost-benefit assessment—which would
have involved placing a monetary value on benefits like averted deaths—launched a tense
battle with OMB officials. They asserted that EPA’s refusal to weigh the costs and benefits
of the regulation had violated Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291175 as well as TSCA, which
they read as requiring cost-benefit analysis.176 OMB subsequently told EPA to revisit its
regulatory impact analysis and more extensively assess the costs and benefits of a ban.177
After receiving these instructions from OMB, EPA career staff tried to contest the
Reagan administration’s position that TSCA’s language on economic costs required formal
cost-benefit balancing over many months during the summer and fall of 1984. They
believed that TSCA called instead for “risk-benefit balancing” that took into account
potential costs but not explicitly “dollars per life saved.”178 However, with OMB holding
the rules hostage and pressuring EPA to refer regulation to OSHA, staff in EPA’s Office of
Pesticides and Toxic Substances eventually went back to the drawing board and sought to
pull together a cost-benefit analysis that would satisfy OMB officials.
EPA’s subsequent attempt to undertake a more formal cost-benefit analysis
revealed several fundamental disagreements between the agency and OMB over three
methodological issues. These were 1) whether and to what extent to discount future
benefits, 2) whether EPA should assess the costs and benefits of asbestos use overall or
break down its analysis into particular uses of the substance, and 3) whether to place a
monetary value on human life and health benefits.

171

EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, Mar. 1984, supra note 169, at 7.
EPA, Asbestos: Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions (undated), Folder “June 1–29, 1984,”
Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 3 of 13, at 54 (hereinafter “EPA, Asbestos Draft
Rule, June 1984”).
173
EPA, Draft Report on Risk Assessment and Risk Management (Sep. 12, 1984), Folder “September
24–30, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 5 of 13, at 26.
174
Note that EPA only examined the cost per cancer case avoided for a ban. See Administrator’s Status
Briefing on Asbestos (Aug. 17, 1984), Folder “August 1–20, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives
Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13, at 4.
175
See Letter from Robert P. Bedell, supra note 129, at 3. EPA did submit a regulatory impact analysis
but opted to simply calculate the number of cancer cases avoided rather than seek to monetize benefits. See
Memorandum from John A. Moore to the Administrator, supra note 121, at 3.
176
See Letter from Robert P. Bedell, supra note 129, at 3.
177
See id.
178
Note from Dick to Jack [John A. Moore] (Sep. 18, 1984), Folder “September 24–30, 1984,” Moore
Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 5 of 13, at 1 (describing his and other career staff
concerns about the Reagan administration’s approach to risk management).
172
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The first issue, discounting, is a common challenge in assessing the benefits of a
regulation whose impact is likely to be felt far into the future.179 The technique reduces the
value of future benefits when monetizing them in today’s present dollars, under the
assumption that people more highly value receiving money today than next year, or twenty
years from now.180 When conducting its initial cost-benefit analysis, EPA chose not to
discount any benefits of the rule.181 Career staff at the agency felt doing so “would
represent a dramatic departure from past EPA practice, would have major implications for
the Agency's carcinogen policies, and would greatly diminish projected benefits of the
proposed asbestos rules.”182 OMB strongly disagreed, believing that it would be
inconsistent to discount future costs—which the agency had done—and not do the same
for benefits.183 It suggested EPA should discount future benefits from avoided cancer cases
using a 10 percent rate, which would significantly reduce the expected benefits of a
regulation.184 OMB justified this number by claiming that 10 percent was “the rate used
most frequently in ‘investment’ decisions.”185 It appears to be the first time such a high
discount rate was proposed to calculate the costs and benefits of an environmental
regulation.186
The second area of disagreement between the two agencies concerned EPA’s
decision to make an overall determination of asbestos’ costs and benefits rather than
breaking down cancer risks by product type. From a health and data perspective, it seemed
to make little sense for EPA to isolate risks by different uses, as exposures were likely to
be cumulative throughout the chemical’s life cycle. OMB, however, argued that EPA
should “disaggregate the costs, benefits, and cost-effectiveness” associated with about 30
or so different “uses” it had identified.187 According to OMB, this was required by the
statute and revealed that EPA did not have enough evidence to show an unreasonable risk
for a multitude of different uses.188 OMB argued these separate analyses might lead EPA to
find that substitute products posed greater hazards than asbestos, particularly replacing
asbestos in automobile brakes, which OMB claimed could lead to a rise in car accidents
that would far outstrip the benefits from reduced cancer rates.189 However, to undertake
such an extensive analysis on 30 different uses would require enormous information,
research, and agency resources, as well as data from industry that EPA lacked.
179

See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 95 (2008); FRANK ACKERMAN &
LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61
(2010).
180
See id.
181
See Hearing on EPA’s Asbestos Regulations, supra note 143, at 24.
182
Id. at 25.
183
See Letter from Robert P. Bedell, supra note 129, at 7.
184
See id.
185
See Letter from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to David A. Stockman, Director of OMB (Dec. 13,
1984), Folder “January 23–30, 1985,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 6 of 13, at
1.
186
See id. at 2.
187
See Letter from Robert P. Bedell, supra note 129, at 1–2.
188
See id. at 3, citing to language in TSCA requiring EPA to consider “the benefits of such substance or
mixture for various uses and the availability of substitutes for such uses” per section 6(c)(1)(C). It is certainly
debatable whether this provision requires a breakdown of costs and benefits by use.
189
See id.
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The third, and perhaps most major, issue concerned what benefits EPA should
monetize and whether, once EPA had done so, the rule would be cost-benefit justified.
EPA officials at the Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances were philosophically
opposed to putting a monetary value on human well-being. They sharply disputed the
Reagan appointees’ emphasis on monetizing health risks, arguing that EPA could not
adequately represent risks “for any adverse effect, including cancer” with “some simple
number.”190 EPA staff therefore did not believe that the agency should try to place a value
on life itself. Instead, they felt EPA should only calculate the dollar value of already
monetized benefits from avoided cancer cases, such as the costs of hospital treatments and
lost wages.191
OMB officials, on the other hand, showed a severe underappreciation of the
difficulty in monetizing health and environmental benefits from EPA toxics regulations.192
They asserted that if the asbestos regulation were truly warranted, EPA should be able to
demonstrate that monetized benefits outweighed monetized costs. OMB based this
argument on a comparison between EPA’s cost-benefit analysis for the asbestos regulation
with one completed for a recently promulgated regulation of lead in gasoline.193 The lead
rule was one of the only environmental regulations to pass cost-benefit muster during the
Reagan administration, and was used as a cudgel in OMB’s critiques of EPA’s cost-benefit
analysis for the asbestos rule. While the cost-benefit analysis for the lead rule showed it
would produce $34.7 billion in net benefits, EPA’s asbestos ban appeared to yield $2.319
billion in net costs based on the agency’s initial calculations.194
Yet the sole reason EPA successfully justified the lead rule on monetized costbenefit grounds was because that regulation produced significant benefits from reduced car
maintenance, which alone outweighed the increased compliance costs to industry.195
Despite lead’s known, widespread health harms, EPA could only monetize certain health
effects in children based on population wide scientific analyses of children’s blood lead
levels.196 If EPA had been forced to rely only on these monetized health benefits, the lead
regulation would not have passed muster with OMB.197
EPA and OMB were thus at a complete impasse over what role cost-benefit
analysis should play in toxics regulation and whether EPA should be able to promulgate
the rule unless monetized benefits outweighed monetized costs. The stalemate between the
two agencies was broken only as a result of Congressional intervention. Congress had
EPA, Draft Report on Risk Assessment and Risk Management (Sep. 12, 1984), Folder “September
24–30, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 5 of 13, at 5 (quote is in
marginalia notes from EPA career staff). This opposition appears to have included both career staff and
some, but not all, political appointees, such as Jack Moore.
191
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, June 1984, supra note 172, at 54–55 (noting that many of these
patients died quickly, which would have further decreased the value of these benefits).
192
See Bruce P. Lanphear, The Impact of Toxins on the Developing Brain, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH
211, 216 (2015) (discussing the challenges of quantifying harms from toxic chemicals on
neurodevelopmental outcomes and noting that “[t]he shape of the dose–response relationship is not well
established for many toxins”).
193
See Letter from Robert P. Bedell, supra note 129, at 2.
194
See id.
195
See id. at Summary Table 1.
196
See EPA OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE (Mar.
24, 1984), at V.12, V.20-V.24.
197
See id. at Executive Summary.
190
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passed TSCA in the hopes that asbestos would be one of the first chemicals regulated
under the law, and OMB’s refusal to allow EPA to issue the asbestos regulations prompted
Representative John Dingell to launch an investigation into the matter. He informed OMB
officials that members of Congress had become alarmed that an “inappropriate” debate
concerning EPA’s asbestos regulations was “raging within the administration” and
requested documentation of all OMB’s discussions with interested parties and other
governmental agencies about the rulemaking.198
Based on a review of agency documents, staff interviews and Congressional
hearings, the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations within the Energy and
Commerce Committee concluded that OMB had used the section 9 referral process as a
pretext in order to block the rule over concerns about its costs to industry.199 The House
subcommittee accused the Reagan administration of engaging in a “constitutionally
subversive review process” that violated TSCA, the APA, Congressional intent and
meaningful judicial review, as well as providing a secret inside track for industry to
influence environmental regulations.200
In addition to raising concerns about OMB’s decision to overrule EPA’s
interpretation of section 9’s referral mechanism, the Congressional representatives strongly
disagreed with OMB’s assertion that TSCA required EPA to engage in formal balancing of
costs and benefits.201 The legislative history of the 1976 law supported their position, as
Congress had opted not to adopt a version of the law that would have required a formal
economic impact statement.202 As stated in the House Committee report accompanying
TSCA in 1976:
The balancing process described above does not require a formal benefitcost analysis under which a monetary value is assigned to the risks
associated with a substance and to the cost to society of proposed regulatory
action on the availability of such benefits. Because a monetary value often
cannot be assigned to a benefit or cost, such an analysis would not be very
useful.203
Congressional representatives also sharply criticized the specific requirements OMB
placed on EPA’s analysis, notably the “use of net monetary benefits as a mechanistic
decision rule,”204 monetizing the value of human life205 and discounting future benefits.206
They were especially appalled by OMB’s recommendation of a 10 percent discount rate.207
Letter from Congressman John Dingell to William D. Ruckelshaus (July 9, 1984), Folder “July 12 –
31, 1984,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13, at 1.
199
Staff of H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 99 th
Cong., EPA’s Asbestos Regulations: Rep. on a Case Study of OMB Interference in Agency Rulemaking 26–
27 (Comm. Print 1985) (hereinafter “EPA’s Asbestos Regulations: Case Study of OMB Interference”)
(noting that discussions between OMB and EPA officials on section 9 devolved into conversations about
“OMB's continued reservations about the proposed regulations on economic grounds”).
200
Id. at 102, 108, 119.
201
See id. 70.
202
See id. at 75.
203
H. Rep. 94–1341, at 14 (1976).
204
EPA’s Asbestos Regulations: Case Study of OMB Interference, supra note 199, at 86.
205
See id. at 77 (“OMB’s attempt to place a monetary value on human life raises fundamental moral
questions . . . [and] underscores one of the inherent flaws of formal cost-benefit analysis.”).
206
See id. at 78.
207
See id.
198
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Fearing that such discounting would prevent the agency from regulating many toxic
substances like carcinogens with long latency periods, they recommended “that the Agency
reject the use of discounting over the latency period of diseases caused by chronic
hazards.”208
The Congressional investigation renewed the battle within the Reagan
administration over whether EPA could move forward with an asbestos rulemaking. After
publication of an official House report on the controversy, EPA’s Office of General
Counsel, Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, and Office of Policy, Planning, and
Evaluation together drafted a legal memorandum concluding that OMB’s assessment of
section 9 was wrong, using many of the same arguments laid out by the House
Subcommittee on Oversight. The memo argued that EPA did have discretion to withhold
referral to other agencies and should do so in the case of asbestos. 209 As Congressman
Dingell continued to accuse OMB of interference and demanded to see all its
communications with EPA, particularly about the costs and benefits of issuing the rule,210
OMB bowed to pressure and gave EPA permission to move forward with regulation of
asbestos.211
Yet Congressional support for EPA’s decision not to pursue a formal cost-benefit
analysis may have set the agency up to provide an insufficient evidentiary basis for the
regulation by understating its actual health benefits.212 As detailed below in Part III, EPA
pursued the worst of both worlds once it finally received clearance from OMB to proceed
with the rulemaking. It produced a cost-benefit assessment that extensively documented
the compliance costs to industry but did little to quantify and monetize the true benefits of
the rule. In doing so, EPA ceded the tool to a deregulatory administration bent on
manipulating it to restrict environmental protections.

III
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN ASBESTOS BAN
When EPA sought to issue its proposed ban for asbestos in 1986, the health
consequences of past asbestos exposure were shocking. Scientists estimated that between
3,300 and 12,000 cancer cases occurred every year because of asbestos use, nearly all of
them fatal.213 An additional 65,000 people were then suffering from asbestosis, a serious
208

Id. at 82.
See Letter from Lee M. Thomas to Representative John Dingell (Oct. 31, 1985), Folder “November
1–14, 1985,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 10 of 13.
210
See Letter from Representative John Dingell to Lee M. Thomas (Oct. 23, 1985), Folder “November
1–14, 1985,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 10 of 13, at 1–2.
211
See EPA, Asbestos; Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing,
Importation and Processing Prohibitions (Jan. 22, 1986), Folder “January 2–31, 1986,” Moore Papers,
National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 10 of 13.
212
EPA has made similar strategic errors in more recent cases involving cost-benefit analysis, notably
Michigan v. EPA. See Catherine Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359,
2419 (2018) (discussing EPA’s decision not to consider costs as part of its threshold decision to regulate
under the Clean Air Act, leading the Supreme Court in 2015 to vacate its regulation in Michigan v. EPA).
213
See EPA, Asbestos; Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing,
Importation, and Processing Prohibitions, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738, 3738 (Jan. 29, 1986).
209
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lung disorder that significantly diminished quality of life and shortened life expectancy.214
These effects, and the scientific research connecting them to asbestos use, were not in
serious dispute among officials at EPA and OMB nor in the broader public health
community.215
At issue instead was whether these health impacts warranted a ban on asbestos use
and what information EPA needed to support such a ban. As explained in Part II, EPA
strenuously disagreed with OMB about using cost-benefit analysis to justify an asbestos
ban. It objected to placing a monetary value on human life for philosophical reasons and
believed that TSCA did not require the agency to engage in formal cost-benefit analysis.
Bolstered in these views by many members of Congress and the legislative history of the
1976 Act, EPA officials in the Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances made a series of
analytic decisions in preparing the evidentiary record for the ban that dramatically
understated its benefits and crippled the agency’s position in subsequent litigation over the
rule. Although the Fifth Circuit decision was fraught with problematic language about how
EPA should conduct cost-benefit analyses for toxics regulations, the court did identify
important flaws and mistakes that EPA could have rectified in the first instance or on
reconsideration of the rule.
Using archival documents and data available to EPA at the time it promulgated the
asbestos regulation, this Part demonstrates that EPA would have been able to justify the
ban on cost-benefit grounds had the agency fully quantified and monetized the expected
benefits. It nevertheless argues that the Corrosion Proof Fittings case illustrates certain
perils of judicial review of agency actions, particularly when evaluating rules based on
highly technical information. Despite these problems with the court’s opinion, EPA could
have reissued the rule with a revised cost-benefit analysis that would have shown net
benefits from the regulation. That it did not was more a product of politics, both internal
and external to the agency, than any fundamental issue with using cost-benefit methods to
justify the ban.
Section A examines EPA’s economic analysis in support of the asbestos ban to
highlight numerous ways in which EPA could have better quantified and monetized the
health benefits of its regulation to show net benefits. While further quantification of harms
would have involved some additional analysis, these efforts would have been fairly
minimal. And in other cases, such as placing a monetary value on lives saved, it was
EPA’s philosophical objections that stood in the way of a more robust analysis, not the
need to perform extensive technical work. Section B then turns to the Corrosion Proof
Fittings case, examining what the court got right and wrong about EPA’s consideration of
the costs and benefits of the rulemaking. Section C assesses the aftermath of the Fifth
Circuit decision and the available evidence for why EPA did not revisit the rule, which
demonstrate that political considerations were largely responsible for EPA’s decision not
214

See id.
See Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, “Unleashed on an Unsuspecting World”: The Asbestos
Information Association and Its Role in Perpetuating a National Epidemic, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 834,
835 (2016) (noting that by the 1970s, there was an extensive scientific literature showing asbestos could
cause “asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma,” though the Asbestos Information Association sought to
cast doubt on this research to prevent asbestos regulations); see also Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons:
The Unattended Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIGATION 584, 588–90 (2007) (explaining
that the harmful health effects from asbestos were widely known by the 1970s, leading to thousands of
asbestos tort lawsuits each year by the mid-1980s).
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to reissue the asbestos ban. Arguments about the inherent flaws in the statute or the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of TSCA instead became a convenient cover for the actual reasons
EPA did not seek to exercise its authority under section 6.
A. EPA’s Analysis in Support of the Rule
The EPA Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances’ opposition to assessing the
costs and benefits of chemical regulations led to several serious problems in the agency’s
approach to the analysis. These were 1) EPA’s decision not to quantify all the expected
harms, notably excluding risks to certain populations as well as from certain uses, 2)
EPA’s refusal to monetize the harms that it did quantify, and 3) EPA’s selection of a short
timeline over which to assess the ban’s benefits. As the analysis below will demonstrate,
fixing these issues would have allowed the agency to justify the ban on cost-benefit
grounds. Additional challenges, such as new OSHA workplace standards and industry’s
voluntary phaseout of asbestos, eventually complicated EPA’s attempt to revise its costbenefit analysis. However, even with these difficulties, EPA would have been able to
justify its ban had the agency sought to fully quantify and monetize the benefits of its
regulation.
There were several ways in which EPA could have better quantified and monetized
the benefits of banning asbestos based on information readily available to the agency. In
numerous instances, EPA opted not to quantify certain health outcomes despite having data
that would have allowed it to do so, often without clear explanation as to why. For
instance, it initially chose to quantify mortality only from lung cancer and mesothelioma,
excluding excess mortality from asbestosis and other cancers, because “lung cancer and
mesothelioma appear to present the gravest threats to human health at current exposure
levels.”216 Quantifying the additional cancers, however, would have raised the death total
by at least 10–20 percent.217
The agency also only assessed the risks of asbestos to small worker populations
numbering in the several thousand.218 Most of the calculations therefore did not quantify
deaths from non-occupational exposures, which were initially estimated to occur at a rate
of 1 in 100,000 in urban settings.219 That risk resulted from exposure to asbestos
throughout the life cycle of its use, including during construction work, releases from
automobile brake pads, and disposal.220 Millions of Americans faced some risk as a result
of these activities, particularly those that lived in proximity to asbestos mines or in urban
areas.221 EPA’s decision not to include these deaths significantly lowered the expected
number of cancers that might be avoided. By the 1980s, about 70 percent of the total U.S.
population lived in urban areas.222 Given a population of about 250 million, 1,750 deaths
would be avoided among the general population according to EPA’s data, almost an
216

Id. at 18, 45.
See id. at 33.
218
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, June 1984, supra note 172, at 29–31.
219
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, Mar. 1984, supra note 169, at 32.
220
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, June 1984, supra note 172, at 36.
221
See id. at 37.
222
See Roger Auch, Janis Taylor & William Acevedo, Urban Growth in American Cities: Glimpses of
U.S. Urbanization, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 2 (Jan. 2004), https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/
circ1252/pdf/circ1252.pdf.
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equivalent number to EPA’s quantified total for workers, which came to 2,279.223 Yet the
agency did not include risks to the general population in its calculations.224
Even among worker populations, internal agency documents reveal that EPA
declined to quantify additional deaths from those involved in certain manufacturing
practices.225 Nor did EPA include some types of workers, such as maintenance staff, whose
jobs did not directly involve asbestos but who were likely to come in contact with the
substance.226 Finally, EPA did not quantify benefits from avoiding future asbestos removal
and disposal, finding the estimates too “speculative” despite having considerable
experience in this area from its asbestos-in-schools program.227
Most problematically, EPA’s analysis placed no monetary value on the lives saved
by the ban. Instead, EPA simply provided the quantified number of avoided deaths from
lung cancer and asbestosis in the limited worker populations described above.228 In
contrast to the asbestos rule, most of the other environmental regulations developed during
this same period monetized benefits from averted health harms.229 EPA records note that
the agency also did not attempt to assign any value to pain and suffering, lost leisure, or
other damages typically valued in tort cases at the time.230 The only monetized benefits
included in the analysis were those that already had a price tag, such as the costs of
hospital treatments for cancer and lost wages from time out of work.231
The other major misstep in examining the potential health benefits of the rule was
EPA’s selection of a short time period to assess the effects of a ban. When it initially
drafted its regulations, EPA decided to evaluate the effects from 1985 through the year
2000. Archived agency records reveal that EPA’s reason for choosing this period was the
agency’s belief that those years would be “when the rule would have the most impact.”232
However, assessing the ban in this way prevented EPA from accurately comparing a world
with continued asbestos use from one without the toxic substance. For instance, had EPA
selected a 30- or 40-year time period, it could have examined a scenario in which
companies continued business as usual, leading to thousands of additional cancers from
continued asbestos use over decades. Even EPA itself acknowledged that its short timeline
underestimated harms from continued asbestos, noting that “[w]ithout regulatory action,
manufacture of asbestos products may continue beyond that date.”233 By only quantifying
See Administrator’s Status Briefing on Asbestos, August 17, 1984, Folder “August 1–20, 1984,”
Controlled and Major Correspondence of Assistant Administrator John Moore, ca. 10/1983 - ca. 8/1988,
National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13, at 4.
224
See id.
225
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, June 1984, supra note 172, at 45.
226
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, Mar. 1984, supra note 169, at 32.
227
Id. at 47.
228
See id. at 55 (finding the first part of the regulation would prevent about 1,065 deaths); EPA,
Asbestos Draft Rule, June 1984, supra note 172, at 43–44 (finding the second part of the regulation would
prevent an additional 1,214 deaths).
229
See EPA OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, EPA’S USE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS,
1981-1986, at S-2 (Aug. 1987) (acknowledging that most of the analyses that monetized benefits were for air
and water pollution regulations, which had better data and analytic techniques to estimate exposures).
230
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, Mar. 1984, supra note 169, at 47.
231
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, June 1984, supra note 172, at 54–55 (noting that many of these
patients died quickly, which would have further decreased the value of these benefits).
232
Memorandum from John A. Moore to the Administrator, supra note 121, at 3.
233
Id. at 41.
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cancer cases during the rule’s implementation, EPA thus further understated the benefits of
a ban.
Fixing these issues in 1984, when EPA first developed its asbestos ban, would have
allowed the agency to justify the ban on cost-benefit grounds.234 And it could have done so
with information from the agency’s own internal records as well as data available to EPA
while it was developing the rule. The calculations below demonstrate how changes in the
populations considered as well as placing a value on lives lost would have shown net
benefits from the ban.235 They rely on internal agency documents made public for the first
time through the author’s Freedom of Information Act Requests.
In 1984, EPA estimated that the costs of the two regulations implementing the
asbestos phaseout would total approximately $1.9 billion using a 10 percent discount
rate.236 Therefore, the cost of the regulations with a more appropriate 3 percent discount
rate over the 15-year implementation period would have been about $5.8 billion. The
health benefits were 2,279 fewer fatalities from cancer resulting from asbestos exposure
during the 15 years it would take to phase out asbestos.237 As asbestos diseases typically
take years to develop, we should conservatively estimate that the benefits of the phaseout
will only begin 15 years after the rule is in place. To monetize the benefits over time, the
most straightforward approach would be to divide the number of total cancer cases over a
30-year window, discounting each based on the year they appear. For instance, using
EPA’s number of 2,279 cancer fatalities, we would assume about 76 cases a year for a
period of 30 years.238
The first important step EPA could have taken to better justify the ban would be to
further quantify additional asbestos-related deaths. It should have done so in two ways: by
incorporating fatalities from diseases other than lung cancer and mesothelioma among
workers and by including harms to the broader U.S. population. As noted above, EPA had
data indicating that fatalities from other occupationally induced diseases would have added
an additional 10–20 percent to the total lives lost. Factoring in harms to the general
population would have further raised this total by another few thousand deaths, as the vast
majority of asbestos linked cancers were fatal. These changes alone would have nearly
doubled the number of expected deaths from cancer to about 4,400.
EPA could have then valued each life saved at $3.7 million in 1982 dollars; this
was the average of the recommended range in EPA’s first guidelines for regulatory impact

234

See infra at text corresponding to notes 251–255.
These are the author’s calculations based on internal data from the Office of Pesticides and Toxic
Substances archived at the National Archives and Records Administration.
236
See Administrator’s Status Briefing on Asbestos (Aug. 17, 1984), Folder “August 1–20, 1984,”
Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 4 of 13, at 4. EPA records do not explicitly state
what discount rate it used in its initial calculation of this number, but it is extremely likely the agency used a
high 10 percent discount rate, as this was the rate EPA used when it finally proposed the rule in 1986 for the
same total costs of $1.9 billion. See EPA, Asbestos; Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed
Manufacturing, Importation, and Processing Prohibitions, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738, 3748 (Jan. 29, 1986).
237
See Administrator’s Status Briefing on Asbestos, supra note 236.
238
The net present value of the lives saved equals the sum of the monetized benefits from averted cancer
deaths for each year over a 30-year timespan, discounted from the year they occur. The benefits for each year
in the 30 year timespan can be calculated using the following equation: (Value of a Statistical Life*(total
cancer deaths/30 year timespan))/((1+discount rate)^years elapsed).
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analyses published in December 1983.239 Using a discount rate of 3 percent, which was the
rate EPA selected in the final rule,240 the monetized benefits would have approached $7.5
billion, outweighing the expected total costs of the regulation. Even using a discount rate
of 10 percent, which was OMB’s controversial recommendation at the time EPA first
proposed the ban, the monetized benefits would have totaled $1.4 billion, only slightly
below its costs. Furthermore, these calculations do not include other benefits of the ban
beyond lives saved from asbestos-related cancers, which would have further bolstered
EPA’s justification for eliminating the chemical from use.241
This exercise shows that cost-benefit methods, done appropriately, were not a true
barrier to regulating asbestos with the information and assumptions used at the time EPA
prepared the asbestos rulemaking.242 The most significant obstacle in EPA’s ability to
justify the rule on cost-benefit grounds was instead OMB’s decision to strongarm EPA into
referring asbestos to OSHA for regulation. As OMB held EPA’s asbestos ban hostage,
OSHA implemented new workplace standards that ostensibly reduced the risks from
asbestos exposure by lowering the maximum exposure levels for workers.243 According to
OSHA, the new restrictions would dramatically lessen the number of expected cancer
cases from occupational exposure to asbestos, especially for firefighters, construction
employees, and service workers.244
Much of the supposed decrease came not from limiting exposure to the chemical
but from the use of personal protective equipment, which was a departure from prior
workplace controls on toxics that sought to prevent chemical releases.245 The use of
personal protective equipment raised substantial risks of noncompliance, especially given
See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS M8 (Dec. 1983) (“If
mortality is to be valued directly, a range of values can be used to determine the sensitivity of the results to
alternative values. Recent studies that measure how much people need to be compensated to incur small risks
provide a means for selecting such values. For example, many of these studies examine the relationship
between risks in the workplace, which typically range between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1,000 on an annual
basis, and wages. They have found that annual wages are between about $4 and $70 higher for jobs with 1 in
100,000 greater risk. This translates into a value for a statistical life of roughly $400,000 to $7,000,000 (in
1982 dollars).”).
240
See 1989 Asbestos Rule, supra note 17, at 29,491.
241
These benefits included reductions in pain and suffering, for instance. See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule,
Mar. 1984, supra note 169, at 47.
242
Some economists have blamed discounting for EPA’s failure to regulate asbestos, but a proper rate
and better quantified cancer fatalities would, as shown here, allowed the ban to be justified on cost benefit
grounds. However, it’s also worth noting that one way to get around the discounting problem for regulating
carcinogens like asbestos would be to use “contingent valuation techniques” that asked how much one would
be willing to pay to reduce the risk of dying thirty years in the future. See Maureen L. Cropper & Paul R.
Portney, Discounting and the Evaluation of Lifesaving Programs, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 369, 376–79
(1990).
243
See Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite,
Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,002 (Oct. 17, 1986), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-1986-10-17/pdf/FR-1986-10-17.pdf.
244
See Memorandum from Michael Shapiro, Director, Economics and Technology Division, to John A.
Moore, Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, Subject: Response to AIA Letter to Lee
Thomas (undated, likely February 1985), Folder “February 25, 1985”, Moore Papers, National Archives
Identifier: 76018974, Box 6 of 13, at Attachment B, Asbestos Related Cancer Cases by Population Category.
245
See EPA’s Comprehensive Strategy Will Reduce Risks from Asbestos (Aug. 26, 1985), Folder
“August 9–31, 1985,” Moore Papers, National Archives Identifier: 76018974, Box 9 of 13 at “Talking Points
for Flip-Chart No. 7.”
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the fact that nearly two-thirds of exposed workers were employed in facilities that were not
subject to OSHA inspections because of their small size.246 It would thus be all too easy for
a company not to provide such protection to their workers, even assuming that the
equipment functioned as intended. For these reasons, EPA believed that OSHA’s new
standards would not adequately reduce risks from exposure.247 Nor would OSHA’s
regulation protect the general population, including families of asbestos workers who
might be exposed to the fibers from an employee’s clothing and shoes.248
Yet with OSHA regulations for personal protective equipment taken into account,
EPA estimated that only 1,325 cancer cases would now occur from asbestos products made
over the next 15 years, the approximate time period over which asbestos would be phased
out.249 EPA’s asbestos regulation would prevent 1,000 of these cancer cases, less than half
the number of avoided fatalities in the agency’s original proposed rulemakings.250
That said, there were still ways EPA could have successfully justified the rule on
cost-benefit grounds using new and better data on general population exposures that
became available to the agency after OSHA promulgated its workplace standards.
Emerging evidence from the National Academy of Sciences now suggested populations in
urban areas had a lifetime risk of cancer from asbestos of 7 in 100,000, considerably higher
than earlier estimates.251 With an estimated 70 percent of the U.S. population living in
urban environments, and most of these cancers leading to death within 2 years,252 this
would have increased the quantified cancer fatalities by a factor of 10. Nevertheless, EPA
still opted not to quantify any benefits to the general public, nor did it quantify any excess
mortality from asbestosis and other cancers that would raise the death toll by 10–20
percent, as in the prior proposed rule.253
Had the agency also quantified the risk to the general public and placed a value on
these avoided deaths, the total monetized benefits of the rule would have exceeded $20
billion using a 3 percent discount rate. Even applying OMB’s 10 percent discount rate, the

246

See id.
See id. at “Talking Points for Flip-Chart No. 3.” and “Talking Points for Flip-Chart No. 7.”
248
It also continued to claim that safe substitutes existed. See id. at “Five Points Compel EPA’s
strategy.”
249
See EPA, Asbestos; Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing,
Importation and Processing Prohibitions (Jan. 22, 1986), Folder “January 2–31, 1986,” Box 10 of 13, at 5.
EPA noted in the proposed rule, however, that these numbers could be higher because of poor compliance.
See id. at 10. This number would have been almost twice as high without OSHA’s rule. See id. at 40.
250
See id. at 40.
251
See id. at 41. The National Academy of Sciences report on nonoccupational exposures was published
in 1984 and estimated nonoccupational risks of developing lung cancer and mesothelioma. Part of the reason
the agency may have been anxious about using these numbers to quantify cancer deaths is that the National
Academy of Sciences stated these numbers should not be taken to be “definitive estimates” but instead used
“qualitatively” because of uncertainties in the exposure data. Nevertheless, given their conclusion that
“[s]ome deaths from mesothelioma and lung cancer will probably result from current and past levels of
exposure to asbestos in ambient air,” it was certainly within EPA’s discretion to estimate potential benefits of
regulating asbestos using this data. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ASBESTIFORM FIBERS: NONOCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
RISKS 3, 211 (1984).
252
See EPA, Asbestos; Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing,
Importation and Processing Prohibitions (Jan. 22, 1986), Folder “January 2–31, 1986,” Box 10 of 13, at 18.
253
See id. at 23.
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benefits would have reached nearly $4.5 billion. Both of these numbers far outstripped the
total costs of the rule, regardless of what discount rate EPA used.254
The agency’s estimates of avoided cancer fatalities dropped even further when it
ultimately issued the regulation in 1989, as during the many years of the rule’s
development several major products containing asbestos were no longer used in the U.S.255
EPA now expected the regulation to avoid just 120–202 cancer cases through the end of
the phaseout in the year 2000. The lower number of 120 represented EPA’s attempt to
“discount” the number of cancer cases from the time the exposure occurred to make them
comparable to the discounted costs.256 This made little analytic sense, however, given that
discounting is a tool to understand the monetized value of future benefits.257 The costs, by
comparison, totaled about $450 million, assuming a three percent discount rate and a slight
yearly decline in the price of substitutes.258 But again, if EPA had simply monetized the
value of those 202 avoided deaths and discounted the total using a 3 percent rate, the
benefits would have totaled about $330 million, nearly comparable to the costs. Further
quantifying cancer deaths, such as from other exposed populations or by assuming minimal
use of personal protective equipment despite OSHA’s new standards, would have
absolutely shown net benefits from the regulation.259
At every stage of the asbestos regulation’s rollout, then, EPA could have better
quantified and monetized the health benefits of a ban to demonstrate that the value of
avoided cancer deaths outweighed the costs.260 The Office of Pesticides and Toxic
Substances’ ideological objections to cost-benefit balancing, not an inherent inability to do
the analysis, were what stood in the way of justifying the rule on cost-benefit grounds.
While OMB’s insistence on using an enormously high discount rate and deference to the
asbestos industry clearly contributed to EPA’s resistance to using cost-benefit methods,
this reexamination of EPA’s cost-benefit analysis shows that it was not the tool itself that
led to so many problems justifying the asbestos ban.
B. The Promise and Peril of Judicial Review in Corrosion Proof Fittings
EPA finally issued its asbestos ban in July 1989, following the tortuous procedural
gauntlet detailed in Part II, Section A.261 Shortly after EPA published the regulation, the
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See id. at 112.
See id. at 29,486.
256
Id. at 29,507.
257
See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF CONTROLS ON ASBESTOS AND ASBESTOS PRODUCTS,
FINAL REPORT II-19 (1989).
258
See 1989 Asbestos Rule, supra note 17, at 29,468.
259
Other commentators significantly criticized EPA’s assumption that OSHA’s standards for personal
protective equipment would be largely followed and result in reduced exposure. See id. at 29,474.
260
The agency’s refusal to place a value on lives saved or further quantify fatalities led to a significantly
lopsided projection of the ban’s consequences, with news articles noting the enormous sums spent to avoid a
seemingly small number of cancers. See, e.g., Barbara Rosewicz, EPA Is to Ban Nearly All Uses of Asbestos
by 1997, WALL STREET J. (July 7, 1989), at B4 (“The EPA estimated that the ban will cost almost $460
million over 13 years . . . and that it will prevent at least 200 cancer deaths over that period. But toxicologist
Ellen Silbergeld of the Environmental Defense Fund, which has sued the EPA over asbestos issues, said at
least 10 times more lives are likely to be saved than the agency estimated.”).
261
See 1989 Asbestos Rule, supra note 17.
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asbestos industry and the Canadian government challenged the rule in the Fifth Circuit,262
arguing that the ban was “out of proportion to the risk.”263 EPA’s problematic cost-benefit
analysis, particularly the seemingly few lives saved at enormous cost, led the court to
question the agency’s rationale for the regulation and remand it to EPA for reconsideration.
The opinion has subsequently become one of the “most vilified cases in
administrative law,”264 especially among those who believe EPA could not have done a
better job with its cost-benefit analysis.265 A few scholars, on the other hand, have praised
the court for remanding the rule and view the opinion as an example of how judicial review
can serve as an important check on a poorly justified regulation.266
Both perspectives are incomplete. The court did provide an important critique of
EPA’s decision not to better quantify and monetize the benefits of the ban, and as
explained previously, it would have been possible for EPA to demonstrate the asbestos
regulation was cost-benefit justified. However, the court’s lack of scientific and technical
literacy contributed to extremely problematic language in the opinion that, if taken
literally, could have tied EPA’s hands on future chemical regulations, especially for
substances without clear dose-response relationships. The judges also gave credence to
dubious industry claims about asbestos’ carcinogenicity and the dangers of substitute
chemicals in their opinion. The case is therefore neither an exemplar of judicial overreach
nor a welcome development in judicial policing of agency expert conclusions.267 It instead
shows both the value and danger of courts wading into the technical details of agency
rulemakings.

TSCA allowed suits over EPA’s chemical regulations to be filed directly in any circuit court of
appeals. See Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2618(a).
263
Marshall Ingwerson, Asbestos Industry Attacks Ban by EPA, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 25,
1989), at 8.
264
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 936 (2018) (“More than seventy years after the APA placed the question of judicial review at the center
of administrative law, no one agrees how it should operate. Scholars do agree on one thing: that the courts
went too far in two notorious cases, Corrosion Proof Fittings v Environmental Protection Agency and
Business Roundtable v Securities and Exchange Commission.”).
265
See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L. J. 1619, 1682 n.218 (2004) (asserting that
the high evidentiary burden placed on EPA after the case was the reason the agency took no further action to
regulate toxic chemicals); John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory
Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L. J. 901, 910 (1998) (citing Corrosion Proof Fittings as
evidence of how heavy burdens in informal rulemaking make it difficult for agency actions to survive
judicial review); Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the
Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897, 904 (2009) (“TSCA's safety gap arises from the
high evidentiary burden that the EPA must satisfy before it can act to restrict or ban a chemical . . .
[f]amously, even its efforts to regulate asbestos were struck down.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Professor
Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L. J. 2341, 2343 (2002) (“The process of gathering health, environmental,
and cost data, dealing with large uncertainties in the data and associated models, quantifying and monetizing
benefits, comparing costs and benefits of realistic alternatives, and providing support for the agency's
conclusions in an administrative record has thoroughly stymied government action.”).
266
See, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 264, at 957–58; CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE:
THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 48–49 (2002); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 14 (1993).
267
For a short summary of the split reactions to Corrosion Proof Fittings, see DANIEL FARBER, ECOPRAGMATISM 38–39 (1999).
262
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Much of the Fifth Circuit’s criticisms involved the agency’s overall approach to
assessing the costs and benefits of the regulation to determine whether a ban was an
appropriate way to reduce the harms from asbestos. For example, the court rightly noted
that EPA had left a significant number of benefits unquantified,268 even though the agency
had information that would have allowed it to quantify these risks.269 EPA, as well as
several environmental organizations that intervened in the litigation, argued that the
regulation should stand given the significant risks not quantified in the final rule,
especially those “to the general population from low-level asbestos exposure.”270 The
agency also pointed to the risks from continued asbestos exposure beyond the rule’s
implementation period, which it had similarly opted not to quantify.271 The court, however,
argued that by not including such risks “in its quantitative analysis, even where doing so
was not difficult, and reserving them as additional factors to buttress the ban, the EPA
improperly transformed permissible considerations into determinative factors.” 272 It
similarly identified several methodological issues that resulted from EPA’s resistance to
undertaking a full cost-benefit analysis, including the agency’s questionable attempt to
discount harms from the time of asbestos exposure rather than when cancer eventually
developed.273
However, while the court was correct in pointing out these issues with EPA’s
assessment of the regulation’s benefits, it displayed no understanding of how or why it
could be impossible to quantify or monetize certain health effects from toxic substances.
Asbestos, unlike many chemicals, had a strong dose-response relationship linking exposure
to cancer, making it possible to develop a numeric risk for population groups and quantify
the likely increase in disease. At the time of the case—and still today—many chemical
substances had no clear dose-response model that would allow the agency to easily
quantify all health impacts. And yet, the court concluded that “unquantified benefits never
were intended as a trump card allowing the EPA to justify any cost calculus, no matter how
high.”274 This over the top, unnecessary dicta took a legitimate criticism of the agency’s
cost-benefit analysis and made it seem as though unquantified benefits could never
constitute the bulk of EPA’s justification for restricting a chemical.
Further undermining support for the ban, according to the Fifth Circuit, was EPA’s
decision to only assess the costs and benefits of various phaseouts, rather than considering

268

See id. at 1218.
See id. at 1219.
270
Id. at 1230 n.20.
271
See id. at 1218.
272
Id. at 1230 n.20.
273
See id. at 1218 (“When the EPA does discount costs or benefits, however, it cannot choose an
unreasonable time upon which to base its discount calculation. Instead of using the time of injury as the
appropriate time from which to discount, as one might expect, the EPA instead used the time of exposure.”).
The court did, however, find that EPA’s selection of a three percent discount rate, which matched the
historical interest rate, was reasonable. It also upheld the agency’s decision to estimate a one percent decline
in substitution pricing. See id. at 1218.
274
Id. at 1219 (“Unquantified benefits can, at times, permissibly tip the balance in close cases. They
cannot, however, be used to effect a wholesale shift on the balance beam. Such a use makes a mockery of the
requirements of TSCA that the EPA weigh the costs of its actions before it chooses the least burdensome
alternative.”).
269
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the costs and benefits of other regulatory alternatives.275 The statute enumerated several
possible controls other than a ban on a substance, such as limiting the amount that could be
used or applying warning labels to products containing the chemical.276 Despite this
statutory language, as the opinion noted, “EPA rejected calculating how many lives a less
burdensome regulation would save, and at what cost.”277 The court found that this violated
TSCA’s requirement that EPA promulgate the “least burdensome” regulation to eliminate
an unreasonable risk.278
It was absolutely legitimate for the court to fault EPA for only assessing the costs
and benefits of a ban, as the “least burdensome” language would seem to demand EPA
show “that there is not some intermediate state of regulation that would be superior to both
the currently regulated and the completely-banned world.”279 In fact, EPA’s own
guidelines for performing regulatory impact analyses at the time stated that the agency
should consider other alternatives within the legislative provision’s scope.280 However, the
court again moved from a legitimate critique of EPA’s analysis to an unwarranted, absurd
claim that “EPA’s regulation cannot stand if there is any other regulation that would
achieve an acceptable level of risk as mandated by TSCA.”281 A requirement that EPA
show no other rule would achieve a similar level of risk reduction is unreasonable–and
likely contributed to fears that any future toxics regulation would simply lead to paralysis
by analysis.282 While there is no set number of alternatives that an agency should examine,
an appropriate number then and now is typically three or four,283 as there is often a tradeoff
between “considering more alternatives and developing more detailed, quantified, and
reliable benefit and cost estimates for fewer alternatives.”284 Read in the context of the rest
of the opinion, it is evident that the court was predominately concerned with the fact that
EPA had not evaluated the costs and benefits of any intermediate restrictions. But this

275

See id. at 1215–16 (arguing EPA did not show that a ban was the least burdensome regulation
warranted).
276
See Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, supra note 14, § 2605(a).
277
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 1217.
280
See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 5 (1984) (describing four
major types of alternatives an agency should consider when regulating).
281
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216 (emphasis added).
282
See E. Donald Elliott, former EPA general counsel, interview by Jody A. Roberts and Kavita D.
Hardy at Willkie Farr and Gallagher LLP, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 2010) (Philadelphia: Chemical
Heritage Foundation, Oral History Transcript 0686) (on file with author), at 7 (hereinafter “Elliott
Interview”) (“I think that the burden of the court opinion, which is that you’ve got to show in the record that
you’ve considered every other possible way of regulating and this is the least drastic one available . . . it’s
just an impossible and impractical burden . . . You just can’t possibly do that. It just asks too much of an
agency.”).
283
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS 16 (2003),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (recommending agencies
analyze “at least three options” where “there is a ‘continuum’ of alternatives for a standard (such as the level
of stringency)”); Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling, & Richard D. Morgenstern, What We Learned, in
REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT 222 (Winston
Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling, & Richard D. Morgenstern eds., 2009) (arguing that agencies “must examine a
reasonable set of alternative policy options” in regulatory impact analyses).
284
EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 280, at 6.
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language seemed to suggest an exhaustive burden on the agency if it sought to ban a
harmful substance.285
The Fifth Circuit’s carelessness here in discussing how many alternatives EPA
would need to examine to justify a ban was compounded by its uninformed forays into the
scientific evidence the agency relied on in promulgating the regulation. For example, the
court repeatedly faulted EPA for overlooking “credible contentions” that potential asbestos
substitutes were carcinogenic.286 However, EPA had determined that such industry claims
were not credible.287 EPA stated in the record that there was insufficient scientific evidence
to show that substitutes had carcinogenic potential at all, let alone equal to that of
asbestos.288 The court took the word of the Asbestos Information Association that such
“credible studies” existed; it also gave credence to the dubious claim originally made by
OMB that brake substitutes would increase car accidents, potentially decreasing the overall
benefits of the rule.289 It did not defer to EPA’s assessment that such technology forcing
was reasonable given that substitute brakes were already used in Europe.290
The court’s laudable criticisms of EPA’s cost-benefit analysis notwithstanding, its
decision to wade into the nuances of how EPA should assess the scientific and economic
evidence for a ban demonstrate the potential dangers of judicial review in such highly
technical cases. The court ignored the important role unquantified benefits were likely to
play in chemical regulation and the absurdity of expecting EPA to prove that no other
regulation could achieve the necessary risk reduction. It also declined to grant EPA
deference on the scientific evidence for the potential harms from substitute products.
Given that the opinion contains both valid points about flaws in EPA’s approach to
the ban and problematic pronouncements about how the agency could justify toxics
regulations going forward, it is a mistake to view the decision as either dooming EPA to
inaction or a model for judicial review. This bifurcated thinking provides little insight into
the proper role of the court in evaluating cost-benefit analyses. The court should have been
more careful to limit its review to the analysis the agency completed. In doing so, it would
not have made uninformed statements about a host of complex, technical aspects of costbenefit assessments in toxics regulation. While correctly pointing out problems with EPA’s
Indeed, many legal commentators at the time noted that this interpretation of “least burdensome”
would eviscerate TSCA, even while agreeing with the court that there were flaws with EPA’s promulgation
of the ban. See, e.g., Granta Y. Nakayama, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA: No Death Penalty for Asbestos
under TSCA Casenote, 1 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 99, 118–19 (1992) (“A strict limitation of TSCA’s
statutory reach, to the single least burdensome regulation would eviscerate TSCA as a toxic substance control
device . . . [p]etitioners would be free to posit a different regulation, slightly narrower in scope, which could
arguably result in a similar reduction in toxic substance exposure.”). On the other hand, the conclusion that
EPA simply couldn’t perform cost-benefit analyses for other regulatory options was incorrect. See Linda
Stadler, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA: Asbestos in the Fifth Circuit--A Battle of Unreasonableness Note,
6 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 423, 433--35 (1992) (arguing that “Corrosion Proof Fittings is a tragedy for the EPA. It
has created an unprecedented and unreasonable burden on the agency’s ability to promulgate rules under
TSCA” because EPA would not have the time or resources to perform cost-benefit analyses for different
regulatory options.)
286
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1224. Similarly, the court appeared to take seriously other
dubious scientific assertions by the asbestos industry plaintiffs, including that certain forms of asbestos fibers
may not be dangerous. See id. at 1227.
287
See id. at 1220.
288
See 1989 Asbestos Rule, supra note 17, at 29,481.
289
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1220.
290
See 1989 Asbestos Rule, supra note 17, at 29,495.
285
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evidence for the ban, the Fifth Circuit opinion’s overly prescriptive language compounded
the agency’s challenges in controlling toxic chemicals and contributed to a backlash
against using cost-benefit methods in environmental rulemakings.
C. EPA’s Response to Corrosion Proof Fittings
After the Fifth Circuit decision, numerous scholars and environmental advocates
argued that the court’s interpretation of TSCA’s cost-benefit requirements made it
pointless for EPA revisit the asbestos regulation or justify any risk management rules at
all.291 Yet as shown in Section A of this Part, it would have been possible to demonstrate
that the benefits of an asbestos ban outweighed the costs if EPA had opted to better
quantify and monetize averted cancer deaths. And in fact, a close examination of internal
agency documents obtained from the National Archives and Records Administration as
well as oral histories with EPA staff reveals that it was primarily political considerations
that drove the agency’s decision not to revise the regulation. This fact has not been
previously known to those outside the agency, including Congress.
Before discussing whether or not to revisit the ban, EPA first sought to appeal the
ruling. The agency felt the court “disregarded the unquantified benefits of the rule” and
overstepped by “substituting its judgement for that of the EPA administrator in balancing
the costs and benefits of the ban.”292 However, the Fifth Circuit denied EPA’s petition for
en banc review.293 When EPA and the Department of Justice declined to seek certiorari in
the Supreme Court,294 EPA was forced to consider whether to revisit the regulation or find
another means of regulating the asbestos products still on the market.295
291

See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 53, at 3, 64 (statement of
Ellen Silbergeld, senior Toxicologist, Environmental Defense Fund) (arguing that the Corrosion Proof
Fitting interpretation of the substantial evidence standard and least burdensome requirement, as well as the
court’s conclusion that determinations of unreasonable risk require cost-benefit analysis, have made TSCA
unworkable); Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1876,
1891 (2000) (“It is undeniably true that cases like Corrosion Proof Fittings place significant informational
demands on CBA and also make it difficult for CBA to take account of complex or nonquantified values.”);
Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on
Health And the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1682 n. 218 (2004) (asserting that the high evidentiary
burden placed on EPA after the case was the reason the agency took no further action to regulate toxic
chemicals); John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L. J. 901, 910 (1998) (citing Corrosion Proof Fittings as evidence of
how heavy burdens in informal rulemaking make it difficult for agency actions to survive judicial review);
Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of
Regulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897, 904 (2009) (“TSCA's safety gap arises from the high
evidentiary burden that the EPA must satisfy before it can act to restrict or ban a chemical . . . [f]amously,
even its efforts to regulate asbestos were struck down.”).
292
Letter from Lynn R. Goldman to B.J. Pigg, President, Asbestos Information Association, Folder “B.J.
Pigg, President, Asbestos Information Association,” Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule FY/1994, National
Archives Record Identifier: 72052350, Box 5 of 7, at 1.
293
See Letter from William K. Reilly to Dr. Richard Laster, Oct. 26, 1992, Folder “Richard Laster,
Laster & Goldman Law Offices,” Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule FY/1992, National Archives Record
Identifier: 72052318, Box 3 of 7, at 2–3.
294
It is not entirely clear how strongly EPA pressed the Department of Justice to take the case to the
Supreme Court, or whether they even asked at all. Staff interviews suggest that political appointees may have
declined to request that the Department of Justice seek certiorari. See Charles L. Elkins, interviewed by Jody
A. Roberts and Kavita D. Hardy, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 9, 2010), Oral History Transcript 0643, Science

43
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189677

43

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 236 [2022]

Forthcoming, Harvard Environmental Law Review, Volume 47
Please do not copy without written permission
At first, EPA officials told Congress that the asbestos ban was “not a dead issue”
and EPA expected to revisit the rule.296 Indeed, there were numerous agency staff who
believed EPA could have reissued the regulation and satisfied the Fifth Circuit’s
requirements for a more robust cost-benefit analysis. One advocate of revising the rule was
E. Donald Elliott, EPA’s general counsel at the time. Elliott believed that EPA had been
“out-lawyered” by the attorneys representing the asbestos industry, who had cleverly
focused on the “least burdensome” language in the statute given EPA’s decision to only
assess the costs and benefits of various bans.297 These arguments were, he felt, picked up
in the court’s demand to consider “every other possible way of regulating” even though
“cost-benefit analysis is not that perfect.”298 Yet Elliott ultimately felt that what the Fifth
Circuit panel really sought was “some evidence that the Agency had considered less drastic
means, and had a rational basis for leaving them aside.”299 He therefore approached staff at
the Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, notably the associate general counsel, to
suggest they consider reissuing the asbestos ban.300
Internal documents from within the agency show that other staff also had a more
balanced view of the Corrosion Proof Fittings opinion and shared Elliott’s belief that the
agency should try to revise the rule. For example, in correspondence with the Asbestos
Information Association,301 EPA Assistant Administrator Lynn R. Goldman stressed that
nothing in the decision cast doubt on the “scientific basis for phasing out asbestos” and
suggested that the opinion would not necessarily prevent the agency from reissuing the
regulation should it choose to do so.302 The former director of the Office of Pesticides and
Toxic Substances, Charles Elkins, also believed that the agency should have either sought
certiorari or redone the rule.303 He felt EPA had simply not done a good enough job

History Institute, at 17 (hereinafter “Elkins Interview) (“In the meantime, the decision came as to whether to
appeal the asbestos court decision. The way that it worked back then was the agency would need to make a
request that the [United States] Department of Justice appeal the case. [The decision time was very short],
like thirty days or something. And I was not able to persuade [Linda Fisher to make the request for an appeal]
. . . I think it was her decision on the substance that she thought . . . that we were over-regulating for the
amount of risk. This might be a legitimate reason not to appeal, I guess, but it wasn’t focused on the reason
for the court’s decision and it threw away ten years worth of work and our best chance to show we could
regulate existing chemicals and it put nothing in its place . . . I was not able to persuade her, and we did not
appeal.”).
295
See Letter from William K. Reilly to Dr. Richard Laster, Oct. 26, 1992, Folder “Richard Laster,
Laster & Goldman Law Offices,” Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule FY/1992, National Archives Record
Identifier: 72052318, Box 3 of 7, at 2–3.
296
Implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 51, at 33 (statement of Linda J.
Fisher, Assistant Administrator, Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, EPA).
297
Elliott Interview, supra note 282, at 7.
298
Id. (noting that courts typically evaluate agency actions for reasonableness, not perfection).
299
Id. at 10.
300
See id.
301
On the Association’s role in perpetuating misinformation about asbestos harms, see Gerald
Markowitz & David Rosner, “Unleashed on an Unsuspecting World”: The Asbestos Information Association
and Its Role in Perpetuating a National Epidemic, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 834–40 (2016).
302
Letter from Lynn R. Goldman to B.J. Pigg, President, Asbestos Information Association, Folder “B.J.
Pigg, President, Asbestos Information Association,” Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule FY/1994, National
Archives Record Identifier: 72052350, Box 5 of 7, at 1.
303
Elkins Interview, supra note 294, at 18 (“I think that my successors must have decided that [if you
spend] five million dollars in ten years and you can’t [regulate an existing chemical, well then, this section of
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explaining why substitutes were safer than asbestos in the Federal Register, and did not
need to do an extensive analysis to reissue the ban.304
Despite this support for revisiting the regulation, EPA opted not to do so, instead
seeking voluntary agreements with manufacturers to phase out certain uses of the
product.305 Multiple issues, both internal and external to the agency, contributed to the
agency’s decision not to revise the rule. The primary problem appears to have been
widespread demoralization among EPA career staff who worked on the regulation, which
was exacerbated by the lack of support among key political appointees for redoing the
rule.306 Elkins, who had played an important role in drafting and advocating for the rule
during his time as the office’s director, had left to become associate general counsel shortly
before the Fifth Circuit decision.307 After his departure, there appears to have been little
support to redo the rule among the remaining political appointees and senior career staff.308
In combination with these internal dynamics, EPA political appointees seemed to
favor securing voluntary agreements to phase out asbestos because many companies were
already switching to other chemical substitutes in anticipation of the ban going into
effect.309 Domestic asbestos consumption peaked in 1973 and had declined considerably
since then as the chemical’s health hazards became more widely known and substitutes
were introduced.310 Even during President Reagan’s first term, when EPA initially drafted
the regulation, consumption had already fallen to less than a third of its 1973 peak. 311 By
the time the Fifth Circuit issued its Corrosion Proof Fittings decision, EPA political
the act is] just not going to work. I think that’s a little harsh, because I thought we did do it, and we could
have won that lawsuit on appeal.”).
304
See id. at 16–17 (“My memory of it, and my reading of it at the time, I think, was we had really failed
on only one point, and that point was that we had not [shown] that the substitutes [for asbestos] were safer
than asbestos [itself]. I was really offended by that [court ruling], because we had spent a lot of time on that,
and I decided we just hadn’t written it well enough . . . the last thing I wanted to do was to take one chemical
off the market and give us something worse . . . So, I said, well, we’ve got the case on that. We’ll just
appeal, because [this court decision is] crazy. Look here. We’ve done this analysis, et cetera. It’s in the
docket. We just didn’t write the Federal Register notice well.”).
305
See Letter from Michael Kergin to Robert M. Sussman, June 10, 1993, Folder “Michael Kergin,
Canadian Embassy,” Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule FY/1993, National Archives Record Identifier:
72052332, Box 2 of 7, at 1.
306
Mark Greenwood, who was the head of the Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances when the
decision came down, felt he could not get anyone to work on section 6 rules after the case was decided
because of such widespread low morale. See Greenwood Interview, supra note 16, at 8 (“[A]s a program
manager at the time, after [the court decision], I could look around and have a sense that we were not going
to be doing any Section 6 rules during the foreseeable future. Because I’m not sure I could have gotten
anybody to [work on a new Section 6 rule].”).
307
The former director, Charles Elkins, felt he was pressured to leave the director position because of
disagreements with political appointees over the asbestos rulemaking, notably Linda Fisher. See Elkins
Interview, supra note 323, at 17.
308
See Linda J. Fisher, former Assistant Administrator, Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic
Substances, interviewed by Jody A. Roberts and Kavita D. Hardy, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 5, 2010), Oral
History Transcript 0645, Science History Institute, at 11–13 (hereinafter “Fisher Interview”) (describing the
demoralization among the staff, explaining “I think part of it was complete demoralization, no question”).
309
See id. It’s worth noting, however, that Elkins felt Fisher may not have felt the regulation was
justified substantively, given its expensive costs. See Elkins Interview, supra note 294, at 17.
310
See Letter from William K. Reilly to Ambassador D.H. Burney (Sep. 25, 1989), Folder “D.H.
Burney, Ambassador, Canadian Embassy,” Asbestos/General FY/1989, National Archives Identifier:
72052296, Box 1 of 7, at 1; see also EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, Mar. 1984, supra note 169, at 4.
311
See EPA, Asbestos Draft Rule, Mar. 1984, supra note 169, at 5.
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appointees felt “people were getting out of asbestos faster than EPA could write a rule.”312
Furthermore, the court had upheld EPA’s right to prohibit “significant new uses” of
asbestos under a different TSCA provision.313 The resumption of chemical uses that had
already been phased out constituted a “significant new use” under the law, which meant
that once companies replaced asbestos with a substitute, they could not reintroduce it
unless they obtained a special waiver from EPA.314
Perhaps most significantly, the asbestos product that posed the greatest risk to most
Americans—asbestos brake pads—had readily available substitutes that worked just as
well, if not better. To some at the agency, it therefore seemed to make far more sense for
EPA to seek voluntary agreements with the automobile industry to switch to these
substitutes and eliminate one of the most hazardous sources of the chemical. 315 There was
also some precedent for such an approach, as the agency had successfully eliminated
asbestos in hair dryers during the early years of the Reagan administration through similar
voluntary agreements.316
These reasons—staff demoralization, a lack of support among key agency
leadership for redoing the rule, and industry’s voluntary phaseout of the most significant
uses of asbestos—were thus responsible for EPA’s decision not to reissue the asbestos ban.
Furthermore, if EPA had returned to the asbestos regulation, the agency’s own economic
guidelines from this period could have provided support for including a few intermediary
alternatives in the cost-benefit analysis to show that a ban was justified, rather than the
litany of options the Fifth Circuit implied would be necessary.317
Despite the nuanced view of Corrosion Proof Fittings within EPA, agency officials
and environmental groups began to claim that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of TSCA’s
requirement to consider the costs and benefits of toxics regulation had made regulation of
asbestos impossible.318 Yet the decision to place the blame on cost-benefit methods, rather
than focus on the actual challenges the agency faced in banning asbestos, set EPA up to
confront the same series of problems after Congress amended the law in 2016.
312
Fisher Interview, supra note 308, at 12 (citing both the loss of morale and industry’s shift away from
asbestos uses as the key reasons the office did not redo the rule).
313
Letter from Lynn R. Goldman to Congressman William Paxon, June 22, 1994, Folder “Honorable
William Paxon,” Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule FY/1994, National Archives Record Identifier: 72052350,
Box 5 of 7.
314
Id.
315
Asbestos manufacturers were not pleased by this approach. See Letter from B.J. Pigg to Carol
Browner, October 1, 1993, Folder “B.J. Pigg, President, Asbestos Information Association,” Asbestos Ban
and Phaseout Rule FY/1994, National Archives Record Identifier: 72052350, Box 5 of 7.
316
See Letter from Lynn R. Goldman to B.J. Pigg, President, Asbestos Information Association, Folder
“B.J. Pigg, President, Asbestos Information Association,” Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule FY/1994,
National Archives Record Identifier: 72052350, Box 5 of 7, at 3–4.
317
See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 280, at 5–6.
318
See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 53, at 64 (1994) (statement
of Ellen Silbergeld, senior Toxicologist, Environmental Defense Fund) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of the least burdensome requirement and their conclusion that determinations of unreasonable
risk require cost-benefit analysis have made TSCA unworkable); GAO 1994 TSCA Report, supra note 57, at
21 (stating that “[o]fficials [in] EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics told us that with the court
decision in the asbestos case, EPA most likely will not attempt to issue regulations under section 6 for
comprehensive bans or restrictions on chemicals” because the Fifth Circuit opinion would require EPA to
conduct a cost-benefit analysis for “each product or use of a chemical, which can number up to a hundred or
more”).
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IV
RECURRING REGULATORY PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE 2016
TSCA AMENDMENTS
When Congress amended TSCA in 2016, Democrats believed they were
exchanging federal preemption of stringent state toxics controls for fixing major flaws in
the statute that hindered EPA’s authority to evaluate and regulate harmful chemicals.319 As
explained in Part I, the myth that the requirements of cost-benefit analysis doomed the
1989 asbestos ban led Democrats to press for changes to section 6 of the law, which
governs existing chemicals. The statute now instructs EPA to determine whether a
chemical poses an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment without
considering costs or other “nonrisk” factors.320 After this initial risk evaluation, the statute
then requires EPA to consider costs and benefits when determining how to regulate a
chemical that poses an unreasonable risk.321
Yet adding statutory language specifying that EPA should assess a chemical’s risks
without consideration of costs or other “nonrisk” factors did not change very much in
practice about how EPA evaluates the potential harms from toxic chemicals. For the 1989
asbestos ban, EPA likewise first assessed the chemical’s health risks before completing its
cost-benefit analysis.322 The major difference in the new law is that EPA is now mandated
to regulate a chemical, at least in some form, if EPA finds that it poses an “unreasonable
risk” based on the risk evaluation.323
As this Part will demonstrate, all this change has done is brought the problems that
plagued the 1989 asbestos ban to the risk evaluation stage of the regulatory process. Risk
evaluations are prone to many of the same errors and manipulations as poorly done costbenefit analyses, especially when overseen by officials who are hostile to environmental
controls. The Trump administration, which was responsible for implementing the new
amendments after the 2016 election, was highly sympathetic to the chemical industry and
reluctant to impose stringent toxics regulations.324 Using similar strategies as the Reagan
Administration’s OMB and asbestos producers, the Trump EPA sought to avoid making

See S. REP. NO. 114–67, at 2 (2015) (“In the years since TSCA was first enacted, it has become clear
that effective implementation of TSCA by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been challenged
by shortcomings in the statute itself, and by several key decisions of Federal Courts and the Agency’s
interpretation of those decisions. S. 697 [the Lautenberg Act] . . . is intended to enhance confidence in the
federal chemical regulatory system, provide EPA the authority necessary for efficient and effective
regulation of chemical risks, and foster safety and innovation in commercial chemistry.”); H. REP. NO. 114–
176, at 17 (2015) (explaining that Congress amended TSCA with “the aim of strengthening the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) ability to evaluate and regulate potentially hazardous
chemicals.”).
320
15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(4)(F)(iii).
321
See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv) (instructing EPA to consider the environmental and health
effects as well as the costs of controlling toxic chemicals).
322
See supra Part III.A.
323
15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
324
See, e.g., Richard Denison, Trump EPA, ACC and Industry Law Firms Colluded to Weaken EPA New
Chemical Safety Reviews, ENV’T DEFENSE FUND BLOG (Mar. 11, 2021), http://blogs.edf.org/health/
2021/03/11/trump-epa-acc-and-industry-law-firms-colluded-to-weaken-epa-new-chemical-safety-reviews/.
319
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findings of “unreasonable risk” by excluding exposures under the purview of other laws or
agencies and inadequately quantifying harmful health effects.
The 2016 amendments thus left EPA vulnerable to the same analytical pitfalls that
beset the asbestos ban. And now, should EPA find that a chemical does not pose an
unreasonable risk through such tactics, states will be prohibited from restricting that
substance. This tragic and unnecessary outcome should prompt legal scholars and
environmental advocates to focus greater attention on the underlying assumptions and
value judgments that undergird all methods of determining pollution harms.325 These
include whether EPA considers every potential exposure route, assumes industry will
ensure worker safety through protective equipment, includes all populations at risk, and
examines the cumulative effects of chemicals rather than analyzing their risks in isolation.
The 2016 amendments would have been much more effective if they had provided explicit
instructions to EPA on each of these matters.
Section A examines the Trump EPA’s first strategy of excluding risks that could be
managed through other environmental laws or government agencies, which parallels
OMB’s attempt to force EPA to refer asbestos to OSHA for regulation. Section B discusses
the Trump EPA’s second strategy of minimizing a chemical’s health and environmental
risks by not fully assessing and quantifying harmful health effects, such as by disregarding
certain health outcomes in the risk evaluation. These efforts mirror EPA’s failure to
adequately quantify risks for the 1989 asbestos ban, although the Trump EPA’s actions
were undoubtedly driven by more nefarious purposes. Section C examines how many of
these issues have continued during the Biden administration, and concludes by suggesting
ways EPA can avoid similar problems going forward when conducting both risk
evaluations and cost-benefit analyses.
A. TSCA as a “Gap-Filling” Statute
EPA officials and Congress have debated how EPA should coordinate action under
TSCA with other federal laws for decades. After TSCA’s passage in 1976, Congressional
representatives and EPA officials frequently referred to it as a “gap filling” statute,
implying that TSCA should be used only as a last resort after other regulatory avenues
were exhausted.326 However, this conception of TSCA’s role in pollution regulation has
the potential to inhibit EPA from assessing and controlling a chemical’s risks. As detailed
in Part II, Section B, OMB forced EPA to refer asbestos regulation to OSHA in the 1980s
to try to avoid more stringent controls under TSCA, since most asbestos exposure
happened in the workplace. It did so at the urging of the asbestos industry, which argued
325

A considerable portion of legal scholarship on environmental regulation has been dominated instead
by debates over whether the method of cost-benefit analysis is inherently deregulatory or if it is the best
metric to judge the wisdom of regulations and can be used in an environmentally progressive fashion. See,
e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 179; Revesz & Livermore, supra note 179; CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT
REVOLUTION (2018). Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits, 49 ENV’T L. 73 (2019).
326
See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Toxic
Substances and Environmental Oversight of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 98th Cong. 50,
276, (1983) (referring to TSCA as a “gap filler” to be used when other federal laws are insufficient to
manage chemical pollution); Reauthorization of the Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 53, at 146, 149
(1994) (stating that “GAO testified that this ‘gap filling’ aspect of TSCA has been a hindrance to action”).
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that EPA should consider residual risks only after OSHA imposed requirements for
personal protective equipment.327 Although EPA could have still justified the ban on costbenefit grounds even with OSHA’s standards in place, the agency was highly skeptical that
personal protective equipment could adequately reduce asbestos risks. It nevertheless
assumed OSHA’s regulation would lower cancers from asbestos exposure, decreasing the
number of lives saved from a potential ban.
When Congress amended TSCA in 2016, it did not make any meaningful changes
to the portion of the statute that addressed TSCA’s relationship to other environmental
laws, nor did it clarify how or when EPA should decide to refer a chemical to another
federal agency.328 The amendments kept in place language from the 1976 law that suggests
TSCA is a stopgap mechanism to be used only after other laws. The revised statute
contains nearly identical provisions instructing EPA to defer to other agencies or use other
laws if the Administration determines that these will sufficiently reduce or eliminate a
chemical’s risks.329
Congress’s lack of attention to this issue has allowed for continued battles over
whether EPA should include chemical risks in toxics regulations that could be controlled
through other environmental laws or by other agencies.330 These disputes are now
occurring over the agency’s risk evaluations, as the amended law directs the agency to
determine whether or not to regulate a chemical at this stage of the process.331
Because EPA cannot consider “costs or other nonrisk factors” at this stage,332 it
now looks to whether a chemical increases the probability of causing harm above a certain
threshold to assess reasonability. For example, to determine whether a risk from a
carcinogenic substance is reasonable or unreasonable, EPA examines whether it increases
the probability of developing cancer above a range of 1 in 1,000,000 to 1 in 10,000
depending on the subpopulation exposed.333 Computing that risk range involves
multiplying a chemical’s hazards by the amount of exposure. 334 Therefore, eliminating
exposure sources will necessarily decrease the calculation of risk.335

327
See EPA’s Asbestos Regulations: Case Study of OMB Interference, supra note 199, at 57–73
(printing a letter from asbestos industry attorneys urging OMB and EPA to defer to OSHA on any potential
asbestos regulations or, in the alternative, for EPA to act only after OSHA implemented workplace controls).
328
While Congress did add language requiring EPA to consider risks to vulnerable subpopulations under
the conditions of use and not to consider costs or other “nonrisk” factors, it did not directly address whether
TSCA should function as a gap-filling statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a)(1).
329
See id. § 2608(a)–(b).
330
See Rebecca Rainey, EPA Narrows Scope of First 10 TSCA Assessments, Drawing Criticisms, INSIDE
TSCA (June 1, 2018) (“EPA's framework rule for evaluating risks of existing chemicals under TSCA
generally precludes consideration of legacy uses, as well as those uses that are regulated by other agencies,
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), arguing it has discretion under the new
law to do so.”).
331
See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
332
Id. § 2605(b)(4)(F)(iii).
333
See, e.g., EPA, RISK EVALUATION FOR METHYLENE CHLORIDE 454 (June 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-06/documents/1_mecl_risk_evaluation_final.pdf
(“Generally, EPA considers 1x10-6 to 1x10-4 as the appropriate benchmark for the general population,
consumer users, and non-occupational PESS.”).
334
See Petitioners Supplemental Brief at 5, Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. EPA, 943 F.3d 397
(9th Cir. 2019).
335
See id.
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In numerous risk evaluations completed during the Trump administration, EPA did
not include certain exposure pathways when assessing whether a chemical poses an
unreasonable risk of harm simply because these pathways could be regulated under other
federal laws.336 The exclusion of these exposure pathways closely mirrors the asbestos
industry and OMB’s efforts to avoid restrictions under TSCA during the Reagan
administration by having OSHA regulate asbestos instead. For example, in a risk
evaluation for the carcinogen 1,4-dioxane, the Trump EPA refused to consider exposures
from air, water, and sediment pathways because they fall under the jurisdiction of other
environmental statutes,337 even though millions of Americans in more than two dozen
states have the chemical in their drinking water.338 Claiming that TSCA functions as a
“gap-filling” statute, EPA argued that excluding such risks was consistent with the
statute’s text and legislative history.339 By ignoring these exposure pathways, the agency
was able to claim that 1,4-dioxane poses no unreasonable risk to the general population,340
even though there is currently no federal limit on 1,4-dioxane in tap water.341
Furthermore, the Trump EPA made some of the same assumptions about personal
protective equipment to minimize the risk of harmful chemicals as EPA did during the
Reagan administration. As noted above in Part III, Section A, in the 1989 asbestos ban
EPA reduced expected worker exposures because of OSHA’s newly promulgated
standards for personal protective equipment even though EPA officials did not believe they
would adequately shield workers.342 Similarly, the Trump EPA assumed workers would
wear personal protective equipment when assessing chemical risks, despite the fact that
such equipment may not be available or deployed adequately.343 For instance, one of the
first chemicals the Trump EPA evaluated under the 2016 amendments was methylene
chloride,344 which is often used in paint strippers and can prove highly toxic in
unventilated spaces. Although OSHA has issued standards requiring personal protective
336

See Procedures for Chemical Risk Evaluation Under the Amended Toxic Substances Control Act, 82
Fed. Reg. 33,726, 33,728, 33,742 (July 20, 2017) (asserting that the agency could exclude exposure pathways
from risk evaluations that were “adequately assessed by another regulatory agency, particularly where the
other agency has effectively managed the risks”).
337
See EPA, RISK EVALUATION FOR 1,4-DIOXANE 34 (Dec. 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2020-12/documents/1._risk_evaluation_for_14-dioxane_casrn_123-91-1.pdf.
338
See Cheryl Hogue, 1,4-Dioxane: Another forever chemical plagues drinking-water utilities,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov. 8, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/environment/pollution/14-DioxaneAnother-forever-chemical/98/i43; EPA, TECHNICAL FACT SHEET – 1,4-DIOXANE (Nov. 2017)
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-03/documents/ffrro_factsheet_contaminant_14dioxane_january2014_final.pdf.
339
Id.
340
See Diana DiGangi, EPA Urged to Regulate 1,4-Dioxane Uses Excluded from Risk Evaluation,
INSIDE EPA (Feb. 4, 2021) (explaining that in the final risk evaluation “EPA retained its controversial draft
conclusion the chemical poses no unreasonable risk to the general population”).
341
See Cheryl Hogue, 1,4-Dioxane: Another forever chemical plagues drinking-water utilities,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov. 8, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/environment/pollution/14-DioxaneAnother-forever-chemical/98/i43; EPA, TECHNICAL FACT SHEET – 1,4-DIOXANE (Nov. 2017)
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-03/documents/ffrro_factsheet_contaminant_14-dioxane
_january2014_final.pdf.
342
See supra Part II.B.
343
See EPA, RISK EVALUATION FOR METHYLENE CHLORIDE (DICHLOROMETHANE, DCM) 60–63 (June
2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-06/documents/1_mecl_risk_evaluation_final.pdf.
344
See id.
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equipment for such uses, methylene chloride has nevertheless caused dozens of worker
deaths over the past several decades.345 By making assumptions about protective
equipment in its risk evaluation for methylene chloride, however, EPA was able to find
that the chemical does not pose an unreasonable risk in numerous occupational settings.346
Whether a court will ultimately find such actions lawful is still unclear.347 The
Biden administration is redoing most of the Trump EPA’s risk evaluations in part because
of the exclusion of pathways under the purview of other laws or agencies, though it is
unclear how extensively the agency will revise the analyses.348 Industry has also picked up
the Trump EPA’s arguments, claiming that the statute requires EPA to regulate chemicals
under other environmental laws if it’s feasible to do so.349 In the meantime, the Trump
EPA’s determinations of no unreasonable risk have remained in place, with the potential to
preempt state controls of chemicals like 1,4-dioxane350 and methylene chloride.351
Regardless of the Biden administration’s efforts to improve upon the Trump EPA’s
approach, these problems demonstrate that Congress did not sufficiently address the
question of how TSCA interacts with other laws and regulations in the 2016 amendments.
In the hands of an administration uninterested in conducting rational analysis to fully
assess a chemical’s risks, the statute provided insufficient guardrails to constrain EPA from
downplaying toxic threats in this way.

345

Anh Hoang et al., Assessment of Methylene Chloride–Related Fatalities in the United States, 19802018, 181 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 797 (2021).
346
See Opening Brief for Petitioners State of New York et al. at 16, Neighbors for Env’t Just. v. EPA,
No. 20-72091 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2021).
347
Labor unions, state attorneys general, environmental organizations and public health groups have
filed petitions for review of EPA’s risk evaluations for excluding such pathways from the risk evaluations, as
well as for other problems with EPA’s assessments. See id. at 27 (“EPA cannot know whether unreasonable
risk can be ‘eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent’ under other laws until it completes a lawful,
comprehensive section 6 risk evaluation that identifies all unreasonable risk posed by a chemical.”); Petition
for Review, International Union et. al v. EPA, No. 21-1057 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 2021); Petition for Review,
New York et al v. EPA, No. 21-70684 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2021) (requesting review of EPA’s 1,4-dioxane risk
evaluation because of these and other problems).
348
See David LaRoss, EPA Sets Timeline for Revisiting Trump-Era TSCA Chemical Evaluations, INSIDE
TSCA (June 30, 2021).
349
See Maria Hegstad, EPA’s 1-BP Air Listing Spurs Industry Calls to Drop or Merge TSCA Rule,
INSIDE TSCA (Aug. 6, 2021).
350
See Response of Petitioners to Motion for Voluntary Remand, Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
No. 21-70162 (9th Cir. July 9, 2021), at 13 (arguing that “leaving EPA’s determinations of no unreasonable
risk in place creates a significant threat of litigation alleging preemption of state regulation of 1,4-dioxane in
a variety of products. Petitioner New York has enacted legislation setting limits on 1,4-dioxane in cleaning
products, cosmetics, and personal care products”); Maria Hegstad, Industry Seen Awaiting EPA 1,4-Dioxane
Process to Claim TSCA Preemption, INSIDE TSCA (June 25, 2021) (“Under the reformed TSCA, when EPA
evaluates uses of an existing chemical and finds no unreasonable risk, it blocks any state or local regulation
of those uses.”).
351
See Eric Gotting, James Votaw, & Adrienne Timmel, TSCA Preemption—Sooner Than Later?,
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/practitionerinsights-tsca-preemptionsooner-than-later (examining how EPA actions could preempt states from regulating
methylene chloride).
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B. Inadequate Assessment and Quantification of Health Harms
To determine whether and how to regulate a toxic chemical, it is essential for EPA
to fully assess and quantify the anticipated harms.352 An adequate risk evaluation and costbenefit analysis both depend on the agency’s comprehensive evaluation of a chemical’s
health and environmental effects.353 A chemical’s uses, the populations exposed, and the
potential hazards should all be part of this assessment process.354 Excluding any subset of
these categories will lead to an inaccurate picture of a chemical’s risks and the costs and
benefits of regulating.
As demonstrated in Part III, Section A, EPA’s decision to examine harms from
only lung cancer and mesothelioma and to consider only worker populations in the 1989
asbestos regulation severely limited the agency’s ability to calculate the expected benefits
of a ban. These problems with the agency’s analysis were a major reason the Fifth Circuit
vacated the ban in Corrosion Proof Fittings.355 While EPA’s mistakes in this regard were
not deliberately designed to underestimate risk, Congress’s lack of attention to this issue in
the 2016 amendments left the agency vulnerable to officials purposefully engaging in
shoddy analysis.
The Trump EPA subsequently exploited the lack of clear statutory language on
these issues and excluded certain health outcomes, populations, and chemical uses from
the risk evaluation process.356 By inadequately assessing and quantifying harms through
these tactics, the agency was able to minimize the dangers from toxic chemicals and avoid
an unreasonable risk finding in numerous risk evaluations.
One of the most galling examples of this ongoing problem occurred in the Trump
EPA’s asbestos risk evaluation. Just as EPA did in preparing the 1989 ban, the Trump EPA
chose to only evaluate the morbidity and mortality from lung cancer and mesothelioma.357
Yet scientific research has documented an increasing number of cancer types that can
result from asbestos exposure, including cancers of the larynx, ovary, pharynx, stomach,

352
See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., THE USE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEW IN EPA'S TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL
ACT RISK EVALUATIONS 53 (2021) (stating that EPA’s unreasonable risk determinations need to be based on
“methods that are rigorous, reproducible, valid, and transparent” and finding that EPA’s current methods fall
short of this goal).
353
See id.; see also EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 7-3–7-4 (2010),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-09/documents/ee-0568-11.pdf (stating that benefits analysis
requires quantification and valuation of effects, and depends on economists working with human health and
ecological risk assessors).
354
See Brief of Amici, The American Academy of Pediatrics, The American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, and The American Public Health Association in Support of Petitioners at 1, Safer
Chemicals, Healthy Families v. EPA, 943 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 2019) (supporting a petition for review of
EPA’s risk evaluation rule for excluding certain chemical uses, populations, and hazards because the rule as
finalized will lead EPA to “ignore significant health risks posed by TSCA-covered chemicals, especially
those affecting pregnant women, infants, and children”).
355
See supra Part III.B.
356
See, e.g., Opening Brief of Petitioners at 30–32, Safer Chemicals, Health Families, 943 F.3d (arguing
that the Trump administration Procedures for risk evaluations will allow EPA to exclude various populations,
health outcomes, and uses).
357
See EPA, RISK EVALUATION FOR ASBESTOS PART I: CHRYSOTILE ASBESTOS 30 (Dec. 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-12/documents/1_risk_evaluation_for_asbestos_part_1_
chrysotile_asbestos.pdf.
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and colorectum.358 EPA also ignored other asbestos related diseases from the risk
evaluation such as interstitial lung disease, which can lead to serious decreases in quality
of life because of an inability to continue with normal daily activities.359 EPA stated that
the agency only considered morbidity and mortality from lung cancer and mesothelioma
because these are the “most critical” harms,360 reasoning that is almost identical to what
EPA did in the 1989 asbestos regulation. Due to these and other manipulations in the
analysis, the Trump EPA was able to conclude that 16 of 32 asbestos uses do not pose an
unreasonable risk,361 prompting a lawsuit by environmental, health, and labor groups.362
Another egregious example of such problems occurred in EPA’s risk evaluation for
the chemical trichloroethylene (TCE). TCE is used in a host of manufacturing processes,
ranging from dry cleaning to making decaffeinated coffee, and has become ubiquitous in
the environment.363 Scientific studies have shown that TCE can cause numerous diseases,
including cancer and autoimmune illnesses.364 But the most significant health harm linked
to the chemical has been fetal heart defects. Research studies have found that TCE can
cause heart malformations in the developing fetus with even minute exposures during
pregnancy.365 As a result, when quantifying risk from TCE, including fetal heart defects
would dramatically increase the expected incidences of harm.366
In an initial draft of the risk evaluation for TCE, EPA appropriately incorporated
fetal cardiac malformations in assessing the health risks from exposure.367 However, EPA
career staff subsequently disclosed that Trump political officials altered the draft risk
evaluation to remove fetal heart defects as a relevant health endpoint in the assessment to

358

See American Public Health Association, Comments on Draft Risk Evaluation of Asbestos 5 (June 2,
2020),
https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/advocacy/testimonyandcomments/200602_apha_epa_sacc_
risk_eval_asbestos.ashx?la=en&hash=5472C2C0E8129D5B621058AC516F56420A8813EF.
359
See id.
360
EPA, RISK EVALUATION FOR ASBESTOS PART I, supra note 357.
361
See David LaRoss, Court Delays Briefing in Asbestos Evaluation Suit Amid ‘Positive’ Talks, INSIDE
TSCA (June 23, 2021).
362
See Petition for Review, Asbestos Disease Awareness Org. v. EPA, No. 21-70160 (9th Cir. Jan. 26,
2021), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2021-02/documents/2021-01-26_petition_for_review_2170160.pdf.
363
See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PEER-REVIEW DRAFT: REPORT ON
CARCINOGENS
MONOGRAPH
ON
TRICHLOROETHYLENE
ii
(June
27,
2014),
https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/about_ntp/monopeerrvw/2014/august/draft_tcemonograph20140812.pdf.
364
See id.; see also Glinda S. Cooper et al., Evidence of Autoimmune-Related Effects of
Trichloroethylene Exposure from Studies in Mice and Humans, 117 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. 696 (2009).
365
See Paula D. Johnson et al., Threshold of Trichloroethylene Contamination in Maternal Drinking
Waters Affecting Fetal Heart Development in the Rat, 111 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. 289 (2003); Stanley J.
Goldberg et al., An Association of Human Congenital Cardiac Malformations and Drinking Water
Contaminants, 16 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 155 (1990).
366
See Environmental Defense Fund, Comments for Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Science
Advisory Committee on Chemicals Review of the Draft Risk Evaluation of Trichloroethylene 36 (Mar. 18,
2020), http://blogs.edf.org/health/files/2020/03/EDF_TCE_Comment_SACC-3-18-20-FINAL.pdf (“EPA’s
scientifically unsupported and contradictory decision results in EPA relying its risk determinations on risk
estimates across various TCE exposure scenarios that are orders of magnitude more lax than those risks
estimates associated with the most sensitive endpoint, fetal cardiac malformations.”).
367
EPA,
RISK
EVALUATION
FOR
TRICHLOROETHYLENE
(Dec.
20,
2019),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6819132-Evaluation.html (a leaked, earlier draft TCE risk
evaluation).
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avoid imposing stringent TCE controls.368 They justified this decision by arguing that
studies of fetal heart defects were not of the highest scientific quality and had been
contradicted by other research.369 However, the alternative studies that EPA cited were
funded by the chemical industry370 and had already prompted widespread criticism by
experts in the field371 as well as environmental groups,372 who pointed out that EPA had
repeatedly used cardiac malformations in past risk assessments to determine TCE’s
hazards.373 Nevertheless, in the final risk evaluation, the agency instead assessed risk using
only TCE’s immune and carcinogenic effects.374 As a result, for each potential exposure,
the final risk evaluation raised the levels presumed to be safe.375 EPA scientists eventually
filed a whistleblower complaint376 accusing their superiors of deliberating tampering with
the risk evaluation for TCE and other chemicals and transferring them to other EPA offices
after they objected.377
The Biden Administration has since acknowledged that the TCE risk evaluation
was subject to “political interference” and must be revised to reflect the best available
science on TCE’s harms.378 Chemical manufacturers, however, have continued to try to
368

See Elizabeth Shogren, EPA Scientists Found a Toxic Chemical Damages Fetal Hearts. The Trump
White House Rewrote Their Assessment, REVEAL NEWS (Feb. 29, 2020), http://revealnews.org/article/epascientists-found-a-toxic-chemical-damages-fetal-hearts-the-trump-white-house-rewrote-their-assessment/.
369
See EPA, RISK EVALUATION FOR TRICHLOROETHYLENE 628–42 (Nov. 2020), https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2020-11/documents/1._risk_evaluation_for_trichloroethylene_tce_casrn_79-01-6.pdf.
370
See Shogren, supra note 368 (noting the Halogenated Solvents Industry Alliance, which represents
the makers of TCE, and the American Chemistry Council funded the study in question).
371
See Raymond B. Runyan et al., Letter to the Editor, 111 BIRTH DEFECTS RES. 1234, 1236 (2019)
(arguing that data from the chemical industry funded study “is insufficient to overcome a substantial
literature showing the sensitivity of the developing heart to environmentally relevant TCE exposures. Their
conclusion that ingestion of TCE in drinking water at less than 1,000 ppm does not cause heart defects is not
supported”).
372
See NRDC, Comments of Jennifer Sass, PhD Senior Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council for
the TSCA SACC Peer Review of the Draft Risk Evaluation of Trichloroethylene (TCE) 6 (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/comments-tce-sacc-20200324.pdf (noting that EPA’s own experts
found the industry sponsored study to be flawed and found “there is an association between TCE
developmental exposures and cardiac defects”).
373
See id.; see also Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 396, at 41 (“EPA has repeatedly examined
TCE-induced cardiac malformations and the use of Johnson et al. 2003 specifically for determining TCE
hazard and risk, concluding the evidence to be scientifically robust and Johnson et al. 2003 to be appropriate
for the derivation of toxicity values and risk estimates.”).
374
See EPA, RISK EVALUATION FOR TRICHLOROETHYLENE 280 (Nov. 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2020-11/documents/1._risk_evaluation_for_trichloroethylene_tce_casrn_79-01-6.pdf
(selecting autoimmune endpoints, rather than fetal heart defects, to perform risk calculations for noncarcinogenic health harms).
375
See Shogren, supra note 368.
376
See Maria Hegstad, OIG Opens ‘Inquiry’ Into TSCA Risk Assessments Based on Staff Complaint,
INSIDE TSCA (July 15, 2021) (noting that EPA’s Office of Inspector General has currently an investigation
into the whistleblowers’ complaint)
377
See Sharon Lerner, Whistleblowers Expose Corruption in EPA Chemical Safety Office, THE
INTERCEPT
(July
2,
2021),
https://theintercept.com/2021/07/02/epa-chemical-safety-corruptionwhistleblowers/.
378
Maria Hegstad, Freedhoff Says ‘Political Interference’ Compromised TSCA TCE Evaluation, INSIDE
TSCA (Mar. 19, 2021) (“White House staff directed [the office of toxics] career staff to alter the draft TCE
risk evaluation to change the point of departure used for making determinations of risk to a less sensitive
endpoint.”).
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discredit the scientific basis for including fetal heart defects in evaluations of the
chemical’s risks, arguing that there is too much uncertainty about these health effects to
base TCE regulations on them.379 And should another administration assume office
seeking environmental deregulation regardless of whether it results in harmful effects to
American society,380 the amended statute does not provide safeguards to prevent these
types of mistakes and manipulations.
C. Executive Branch Solutions to the Ongoing Problems with Toxic Chemical
Regulations
Given Congress’s inability to pass bipartisan legislation on a host of domestic
priorities, including environmental issues, it is unlikely that Republicans and Democrats
will be able to reach an agreement on amending TSCA again any time soon. 381 Rather than
suggest legislative reforms to the law, then, this section focuses on near-term solutions that
the Biden EPA can take to improve the underlying rationale for toxic chemical controls.
These efforts won’t directly prevent a future administration from engaging in similar
tactics to the Trump-era EPA. However, by implementing a sounder analytical approach to
toxics regulation, they will make it more difficult for future administrations to persuade a
court that it has rational reasons for departing from these practices.382
One potential mechanism for ensuring that toxic chemical regulations are based on
the best available scientific studies and robust cost-benefit analysis is for EPA to revise its
TSCA procedural rule for conducting chemical risk evaluations. Under the 2016
amendments, EPA was required to issue a regulation to govern the risk evaluation process
for toxic chemicals,383 which it finalized in 2017 shortly after the Trump administration
took office.384
The Trump administration made several changes to EPA’s procedural regulation at
the behest of the chemical industry that appeared to give the agency discretion to ignore
certain harms from toxic chemicals by limiting the uses and exposures considered in a risk
379
See Maria Hegstad, EPA’s TCE Study Renews Industry Fears Over TSCA Unreasonable Risk Bar,
INSIDE TSCA (Jan. 12, 2021) (“[The American Chemistry Council] told EPA last year that even though the
agency based its overall risk estimate for non-cancer effects of exposure to TCE on immune system effects
rather than the more-sensitive fetal cardiac defects (FCDs) identified in the Johnson study, it is still
concerned that its inclusion of the Johnson study could leave the door open to addressing risks of FCD when
EPA writes risk management rules in the future.”).
380
See generally Richard L. Revesz, Destabilizing Environmental Regulation: The Trump
Administration’s Concerted Attack on Regulatory Analysis, 47 ECOLOGY L. Q. 887 (2020) (describing how
the Trump administration has undertaken “a series of deregulatory moves” to undercut environmental
regulations).
381
See Riley E. Dunlap, Partisan Polarization on the Environment Grows Under Trump, GALLUP BLOG
(Apr. 5, 2019) (finding that the partisan gap on concern for environmental issues widened further during the
Trump administration, growing from a difference of 25 percentage points under President George W. Bush to
an average of 45 percentage points under President Donald J. Trump).
382
See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009) (explaining that “when a
new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy,” the agency must
provide “a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate”); see
also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
383
See 15 U.S.C. 2605(b)(4)(A).
384
See Procedures for Chemical Risk Evaluation Under the Amended Toxic Substances Control Act, 82
Fed. Reg. 33,726 (July 20, 2017).
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evaluation.385 Environmental groups subsequently sued the administration over the
procedural rule, arguing that it was inconsistent with several aspects of the 2016 TSCA
amendments.386 In Safer Chemicals v. EPA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that many of these challenges to the procedural rule were premature and dismissed
them on standing and ripeness grounds.387 The court determined that it was too speculative
to know whether the procedural rule would lead to risk evaluations that violated TSCA’s
mandates, as “it is not clear, due to the ambiguous text of the Risk Evaluation Rule,
whether the Agency will actually conduct risk evaluations in the manner Petitioners
fear.”388
With seven of the ten risk evaluations completed under the Trump administration
currently slated for revision, it is now evident that the 2017 procedural rule for risk
evaluations did allow EPA to conduct risk evaluations in ways that minimized the potential
benefits of regulations. Indeed, the National Academy of Sciences recently reviewed
EPA’s risk evaluation methodology and found it lacking in objectivity, transparency, and
comprehensiveness.389 In addition to ensuring the agency relies on the best available
science and fully quantifies the identified risks, EPA could also specify that the risk
evaluations should include exposure pathways that might fall under the jurisdiction of
other laws or agencies, avoiding the interagency battles that compromised the 1989
asbestos ban and the more recent risk evaluations during the Trump administration.
After some delay, in December of 2021 the Biden administration announced that it
intended to revise the procedural rule, with the proposed rule expected in September
2022.390 In crafting a new approach, there are several key steps the Biden EPA should take
to ensure the agency fully assesses a chemical’s risks and selects a regulatory option that
maximizes the benefits from controls.
First, under the revised procedural rule, EPA should be required to assess
exposures from all pathways, such as air, water, soil, and the workplace, even if they fall
under the jurisdiction of other laws or agencies. This will ensure that the agency obtains as
complete a picture as possible of a chemical’s risks. It will also allow EPA and public
stakeholders to have a more transparent, evidence-based debate about whether to manage
these risks under TSCA or other environmental laws. And crucially, it will provide more
robust data and information on the expected health harms for determining whether there is
an unreasonable risk and, if so, what the health and environmental benefits will be of
restricting a chemical.
Second, the procedural rule should make clear that EPA must evaluate the potential
for health harms without assuming that any control techniques or protective equipment are
385

See Opening Brief of Petitioners at 12-16, Safer Chems. v. United States EPA, 943 F.3d 397 (9th Cir.
2019) (describing how the Trump administration changed the proposed rule on risk evaluation procedures to
be more favorable to industry at the request of the American Chemistry Council, a trade group representing
industry interests).
386
See id. at 1.
387
See 943 F.3d at 413.
388
Id.
389
See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE USE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEW IN EPA'S TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL
ACT RISK EVALUATIONS 6 (2021).
390
See OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, RECONSIDERATION OF PROCEDURES FOR CHEMICAL RISK EVALUATION
UNDER THE AMENDED TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (Dec. 2021),
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202110&RIN=2070-AK90.
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used. These options to reduce exposure are better assessed when deciding how to manage
chemical risks alongside other technological solutions as well as more restrictive
prohibitions.
The Biden administration also has the opportunity to set an important precedent for
future toxics regulations through its recently proposed ban on chrysotile asbestos, one of
the most common types of the substance.391 While environmental and health advocacy
groups have praised the agency’s decision to outright ban chrysotile asbestos,392 the draft
of the proposed rule and the accompanying cost-benefit analysis demonstrate that the
Biden EPA made little headway in resolving the issues identified in this paper.393 The
proposed rule’s cost-benefit analysis claimed the ban would generate just a few thousand
dollars in direct health benefits from avoided cancer cases,394 even as more than 40,000
Americans continue to die every year from asbestos exposure. While the draft regulation
reaches a long-sought policy goal, then, the agency’s poor analytical justifications set an
unfortunate precedent for future TSCA rulemakings and leaves the proposed ban more
vulnerable to legal challenges.395
The cost-benefit analysis accompanying the Biden EPA’s proposed ban understates
the expected health benefits by making many of same analytical missteps as the 1989 rule
and Trump-era risk evaluations. The agency assumes exposures will be considerably
reduced through personal protective equipment even though it has access to data showing
that these devices often do not reduce inhalation as expected.396 It also ignores risks to the
general population and ongoing harms from so-called “legacy” uses, among other errors.397
EPA can remedy some of these problematic assumptions before it finalizes the rule, but
other issues cannot be easily fixed because of the poorly done Trump-era risk evaluation.
The agency can only monetize health benefits that are already counted, further
underscoring the missed opportunity to address these issues in the 2016 amendments. At a
minimum, then, the Biden EPA should follow executive branch guidance on the best
practices for cost-benefit analysis and recognize that a considerable number of health
benefits from the ban have not been captured in its analyses.398

391

See EPA, Asbestos Part 1: Chrysotile Asbestos, 87 Fed. Reg. 21,706 (Apr. 12, 2022).
See Maria Hegstad, EPA Proposes Chrysotile Asbestos Ban in Landmark Step Under TSCA, INSIDE
TSCA (Apr. 5, 2022) (quoting the President of the Asbestos Disease Awareness Association as stating that
the rule “is a strong step forward in eliminating exposure to a substance that is killing 40,000 Americans each
year”).
393
See generally Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Comments on Asbestos Part 1: Chrysotile Asbestos (July 13,
2022), https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Policy_Integrity_Asbestos_Risk_Management_Rule_
Comment_Letter_Final_July_13.pdf.
394
See EPA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TSCA SECTION 6 PROPOSED RULE FOR ASBESTOS RISK
MANAGEMENT, PART 1 4-24, tbl. 4-21 (Apr. 2022) (hereinafter “ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR ASBESTOS RISK
MANAGEMENT”).
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See Hegstad, supra note 392 (noting that “the rulemaking could set important precedents for how
EPA will craft rules based on those [prior risk] evaluations”).
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See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR ASBESTOS RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 394, at 4-9–4-17.
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EPA is planning to address these legacy uses in a second regulation after a lawsuit from public health
and environmental organizations. See David LaRoss, ADAO Ramps Up Push For ‘Full Asbestos Ban’
Following TSCA Proposal, INSIDE TSCA (Apr. 19, 2022).
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See, e.g., EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-09/documents/ee-0568-11.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, supra
note 283, at 26.
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These efforts will provide an evidentiary record that will be more likely to
withstand judicial review as well as attempts at reversal in future administrations that may
be hostile to environmental regulations. Though Corrosion Proof Fittings is certainly an
example of aggressive judicial scrutiny of an agency’s evidence for a rulemaking, courts
continue to closely examine agencies’ cost-benefit analyses.399 Furthermore, an extensive
record of a rule’s benefits can insulate it from a future administration’s rollbacks,400 which
is an ongoing threat to pollution regulations given political polarization on environmental
issues.
The above proposals cannot guarantee that EPA never again puts forward a poorly
supported toxics regulation, whether through ineptitude or deliberate malfeasance. But they
will undoubtedly increase the odds that EPA’s rulemakings protect Americans from toxic
chemicals. With tens of thousands of chemicals in use that have never been tested for
safety,401 EPA must press forward with managing the potentially serious health risks they
pose.402

CONCLUSION
On the day that Congress passed the final bill enacting the 2016 TSCA
amendments, Senator Barbara Boxer of California spoke on the Senate floor to discuss
why she had decided to vote for the legislation. Throughout debates over TSCA reform,
Senator Boxer had been skeptical about the wisdom of exchanging federal preemption of
state toxics controls for amendments to the 1976 law. In the end, she decided to support the
bill because the revised statute would allow a “good EPA” to “deliver a much safer
environment for the American people.”403 With a “bad EPA,” she said, not much would get
done, but at least “if a bad EPA takes no action, States will be free to act.”404
Yet Senator Boxer’s belief that a “bad EPA” simply meant no toxics control,
leaving states free to regulate, turned out to be mistaken. The revised statute preempts state
action on a chemical when EPA determines that it does not pose an unreasonable risk. And
by eliminating exposure pathways and insufficiently quantifying harms, a “bad EPA” can
complete an analysis purporting to show chemicals are safe even when they are not. These
determinations will then make it impossible for states to restrict use of these chemicals
See City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e will [not] tolerate rules
based on arbitrary and capricious cost-benefit analyses”); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d
1032, 1036, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (When an agency decides to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its
rulemaking, a serious flaw undermining that analysis can render the rule unreasonable.”).
400
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009) (finding that “a reasoned
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior
policy”).
401
See Schmidt, supra note 43.
402
See David LaRoss, EPA Sets Timeline for Revisiting Trump-Era TSCA Chemical Evaluations, INSIDE
TSCA (June 30, 2021).
403
162 CONG. REC. S3512 (daily ed. June 7, 2016) (statement of Senator Barbara Boxer) (“Looking
forward, I want to make a point. This new TSCA law will only be as good as the EPA is good. With a good
EPA, we can deliver a much safer environment for the American people—safer products, less exposure to
harmful toxics, and better health for our people. With a bad EPA that does not value these goals, not much
will get done. But, again, if a bad EPA takes no action, States will be free to act.”).
404
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under the 2016 amendments’ preemption provisions.405 Congress, in revising the law, thus
gave the chemical industry a powerful mechanism to weaken environmental and public
health protections under an administration predisposed to protecting their interests.
The tragedy of the 2016 amendments is that this preemption bargain was
unnecessary and did not fix the problems that led to EPA’s struggles to regulate existing
chemicals like asbestos. As this article has shown, it was based on flawed assumptions
about why EPA’s asbestos ban did not survive judicial review and the agency’s inability to
justify its toxics regulation on cost-benefit grounds. If EPA had performed a cost-benefit
analysis that further quantified and monetized the health benefits of banning asbestos, it
would have been able to show that a ban was warranted. The combination of a Presidential
administration hostile to environmental controls and an agency deeply concerned about the
ethics of placing a value on human life and health resulted in EPA producing a flawed
analysis in support of the ban. And while portions of the Fifth Circuit opinion in Corrosion
Proof Fittings overstated what EPA should be required to demonstrate in a cost-benefit
analysis, this was not the only or even the best reading of the opinion. Many EPA staff
believed the agency could have reissued the rule and satisfied the court’s concerns, but
political considerations ultimately led EPA to pursue voluntary agreements with industry
instead of revising the rule.
Agency officials nevertheless allowed a misleading narrative to develop about why
EPA struggled to justify its 1989 asbestos ban, which blamed the need to do cost-benefit
analysis for the problems in banning asbestos and other chemicals on the market. Not only
was this characterization factually incorrect, but it also led advocates for TSCA reform to
overlook the actual reasons EPA struggled to ban asbestos. These were conflicts over
whether to regulate under TSCA or other laws and inadequate quantification of health
harms.
Rather than revising the law to deal with these issues, Congress simply shifted
them to the risk evaluation process through the 2016 amendments. Risk evaluations and
cost-benefit analyses are both important analytical methods for determining when and how
to regulate toxic chemicals. But as this article has demonstrated, they can each be misused
to understate a chemical’s harmful effects through similar means. One method is not
necessarily more insulated than the other from mistakes or manipulation by industry
interests. If Congress, environmental organizations, and other advocates for TSCA reform
had understood the true reasons for EPA’s struggles to ban asbestos, they could have
approached calls to reform toxics regulation differently to better confront such problems
and not given up state preemption for an ineffective statutory fix. Bad history,
unfortunately, led Congress to reform TSCA without addressing the root challenges of
regulating dangerous chemicals.
See Diana DiGangi, Environmentalists Fear TSCA Preemption Of States’ Broad PFAS Limits, INSIDE
TSCA (Mar. 1, 2021) (“Following new steps by several states to regulate per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances
(PFAS) as a class, environmentalists are now warning against new EPA rules on the same subject that could
open the “Pandora’s box” of TSCA preemption.”); Elizabeth Shogren, New York Bill to Ban Toxic Solvent
TCE Awaits Governor’s Signature, REVEAL NEWS (Aug. 4, 2020), https://revealnews.org/article/new-yorkbill-to-ban-toxic-solvent-tce-awaits-governors-signature/ (explaining that federal action on TCE could
preempt New York state efforts to ban the chemical); Laura Berryman, States Move to Regulate Toxic
Chemicals; Federal Government Still Far Behind, PUB. HEALTH WATCH (May 10, 2022),
https://publichealthwatch.org/2022/05/10/states-move-to-regulate-toxic-chemicals-federal-government-stillfar-behind/.
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